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Secondary Liability for Online Trademark Infringement:   
The International Landscape 
Graeme B. Dinwoodie* 
Introduction 
In U.S. law, the expression “secondary liability” is an umbrella term 
encompassing a number of different types of trademark infringement claims,1 but 
its essential meaning is that liability does not turn on the defendant itself using the 
plaintiff’s mark.  Rather, in such cases, the defendant is held responsible for the 
infringements occasioned by a third party’s use of the plaintiff’s mark.  Trademark 
owners might strategically prefer to bring a secondary liability claim instead of 
suing the third party infringer.  A secondary infringement action may increase 
efficiency by allowing the mark owner to secure, in a single proceeding, relief 
against a party whose conduct is simultaneously enabling multiple acts of 
infringement by a number of primary infringers.2 
 
 * Professor of Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law, University of Oxford; 
Director, Oxford Intellectual Property Research Centre.  Copyright 2014, Graeme B. Dinwoodie.  I am 
particularly grateful for numerous exchanges on this subject with Stacey Dogan and Annette Kur, and 
thank Frederick Mostert, Martin Senftleben and Martin Husovec for their comments on an earlier draft. 
 1. Secondary liability can be participant-based or relationship-based.  Participant-based liability 
occurs by virtue of the secondary infringer inducing or contributing to or facilitating the harmful 
conduct of the primary infringer (typically called “contributory infringement” under U.S. law).  This 
type of claim tends to revolve in part around the level of knowledge of the defendant concerning the 
infringing conduct, sometimes constructively imputed through proxies, and the extent to which the 
defendant has actively contributed to cause the harm regarded as actionable by trademark law.  
Alternatively, secondary liability may arise where the defendant benefits from the harm and is 
sufficiently close in relationship to the primary infringer that the law will treat them as one and the 
same.  This relationship-based liability reflects the principle of respondeat superior and informs, for 
example, U.S. law on vicarious trademark infringement.  See Hard Rock Café Licensing Corp. v. 
Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that vicarious liability requires “a 
finding that the defendant and the infringer have an apparent or actual partnership, have authority to 
bind one another in transactions with third parties or exercise joint ownership or control over the 
infringing product”).  This Article excludes detailed discussion of vicarious liability, which largely 
presents easier cases.  Most countries have such extensions of liability, and they are largely 
uncontroversial, albeit with local differences as to the type of relationships that are regarded as 
sufficiently close to impose liability.  Instead, rather than secondary liability flowing from relationships, 
this Article will concentrate on liability based upon the nature and extent of the defendant’s participation 
in an alleged tort. 
 2. Hence, a secondary infringement action may ensure more effective enforcement.  See Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (making the point in relation to 
copyright and patent law).  It might also allow de facto worldwide relief depending upon the extent to 
which the intermediary’s business is globally integrated.  See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss & Annette Kur, The Law Applicable to Secondary Liability in Intellectual Property Cases, 42 
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The advent of the Internet has only enhanced some of these strategic benefits.  
The efficiency gains are magnified substantially when the number of infringements 
to which the secondary liability defendant contributes are multiplied many times 
over.  And looking forward, the secondary liability action might shift some of the 
costs of trademark enforcement to intermediaries.  This occurs whether the mark 
owner directly secures relief from a court that requires an intermediary to undertake 
certain detection and prevention measures, or because the intermediary adjusts its 
practices to be more conservative in light of an award made against it under 
principles of secondary liability.  This means that a finding of secondary liability 
may enable mark owners to affect the future structure of business models employed 
by intermediaries and the direction of technological development considered by 
intermediaries. 
Of course, this last strategic benefit to mark owners creates the specter of highly 
intrusive regulation of the business of intermediaries operating in the online 
environment.3  In particular, secondary liability claims bring into focus the effect of 
liability upon technological development, which is not traditionally considered as a 
central part of trademark (as opposed to copyright or patent) policymaking.  Thus, 
in these cases, we must balance the rights of the mark owner with enabling 
legitimate development of innovative technologies that allow new ways of trading 
in goods (or offering services).4 
 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 201 (2009). 
 3. Stacey Dogan suggests that, in the United States, this risk is most acutely raised by cases 
assessing the liability of intermediaries under an undesirable form of direct trademark infringement that 
takes into account the “design choices” of the intermediary, whereas proper secondary liability rules do 
not run this risk because they are grounded in analysis of the reasonableness of response to specific 
notice.  See Stacey L. Dogan, Principled Standards vs. Boundless Discretion:  A Tale of Two 
Approaches to Intermediary Trademark Liability Online, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 503 (2014).  
Certainly, in the copyright context, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to find secondary liability 
based upon design choices alone.  See id. at 514.  But the Court has recognized the relevance of design 
choice to determinations of inducement liability when combined with other evidence.  See MGM 
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 939 (2005) (“[T]his evidence of unlawful objective is given 
added significance by MGM’s showing that neither company attempted to develop filtering tools or 
other mechanisms to diminish the infringing activity using their software . . . .”). 
 4. Claims of primary trademark infringement in fact implicate a far greater range of social 
values than our doctrine perhaps acknowledges.  But the core of the primary infringement claim turns on 
the effect of the defendant’s use on the signaling function of marks.  In the copyright context, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has commented that secondary infringement claims more directly involve the trade-off 
between “supporting creative pursuits . . . and promoting innovation in [the] new communication 
technologies [that make infringement possible].”  Grokster, 545 U.S. at 928.  This is, to some extent, 
also true in trademark law.  And, if so, it may counsel that trademark law borrow more than U.S. courts 
have borrowed thus far from contemporary copyright doctrine.  Cf. Dogan, supra note 3, at 503, 504 
(suggesting that courts applying the trademark doctrine properly are drawing, and should draw, upon 
principles developed in copyright cases).  As secondary infringement claims in copyright touched on the 
sale of new technological products that could—like the services offered by many online 
intermediaries—be used for purposes both good and ill, the U.S. Supreme Court in Sony looked to the 
staple article of commerce doctrine from patent law to fashion the doctrine of substantial non-infringing 
use.  See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.  Once the broader significance of online secondary trademark 
infringement claims are recognized, perhaps that doctrine must migrate further to trademark law.  
However, in the United States, the relationship between the tests for secondary infringement of 
copyright and trademark has been the subject of skeptical comment by many courts and scholars.  In 
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The online context of many contemporary uses of trademarks has also, as in 
other areas of intellectual property law, prompted a demand for international 
solutions to the potential liability of intermediaries for secondary trademark 
infringement.  Most countries have long recognized a cause of action for engaging 
in conduct that U.S. law would call secondary trademark infringement.  But in 
many countries outside the United States, those causes of action are not 
denominated as actions for “secondary infringement.”  Nor are those claims always 
theoretically conceived in the same way they are under American law.  In some 
countries, courts will treat a fact pattern handled by U.S. law under the rubric of 
secondary liability as involving direct liability under tort law for failure to conduct 
business in a particular way or a failure to take certain reasonable precautions.5 
This Article assesses the international treatment of these causes of action, first 
by looking at international law principles as conventionally understood—namely, 
state-to-state obligations regarding the content of domestic law (Part I.A.).  
However, there is little of relevance to the secondary liability question if the 
international landscape is understood in those terms.  Thus, the Article also 
analyzes commercial practices that are contributing to soft transnational law (Part 
I.B.) and compares the regimes adopted by the United States and the European 
Union as leading examples of approaches to the secondary liability question (Part 
II).6 
This Article will touch on developments in some countries that would not be 
described as “secondary” under the laws of those countries.  But, to ground 
 
Sony, the U.S. Supreme Court noted the kinship on this topic between copyright and patent law, but 
rejected the idea that there might be a similar kinship between copyright and trademark law.  Id. at 439 
n.19.  Indeed, the Court refused to apply its own standard for contributory trademark infringement, 
which it clearly saw as more difficult to satisfy (at least in the fact pattern at issue in Sony).  Id. (“If 
Inwood’s narrow standard for contributory trademark infringement governed here, respondents’ claim of 
contributory infringement would merit little discussion.  Sony certainly does not “intentionally induc[e]” 
its customers to make infringing uses of respondents’ copyrights, nor does it supply its products to 
identified individuals known by it to be engaging in continuing infringement of respondents’ 
copyrights”).  Recent U.S. trademark decisions endorse the suggestion that the standards in copyright 
and trademark cases are different.  See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 806 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (“The tests for secondary trademark infringement are even more difficult to satisfy than those 
required to find secondary copyright infringement.”).  In Europe, the relevant principles (especially in 
online cases) are applied more horizontally, applicable both to copyright and trademark claims.  See 
infra text accompanying notes 182−209. 
 5. Liability flowing directly from the failure to conduct business in a particular way or a failure 
to take certain reasonable precautions can be understood as an isolated culpability determination, giving 
rise to a claim in tort or unfair competition.  But such failures can also be relevant to questions of 
knowledge and level of contribution normally informing secondary liability.  Cf. Dogan, supra note 3, at 
510 n.38. 
 6. There is interesting law on secondary liability in many other countries, but considerations of 
space preclude addressing it here.  See generally Du Ying, Secondary Liability for Trademark 
Infringement Online:  Legislation and Judicial Decisions in China, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 541 (2014) 
(discussing China’s approach to secondary liability); Irene Calboli, Reading the Tea Leaves in 
Singapore:  Who Will Be Left Holding the Bag for Secondary Trademark Infringement on the Internet?, 
37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 593 (2014) (discussing Singapore’s approach to secondary liability); Frederick 
W. Mostert and Martin B. Schwimmer, Notice and Takedown for Trademarks, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 
249, 252 (2011) (discussing China’s approach to secondary liability). 
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discussion, it will focus on parallel fact patterns that have been litigated to the 
appellate level in a number of countries.  The paradigmatic cases considered are:  
(1) claims brought against online auction sites, each essentially alleging that the 
auction site could have done more to stop the sale of counterfeit and other allegedly 
infringing items by third parties on its Web site and (2) claims brought against 
search engines alleging that the sale of keyword advertising consisting of the 
trademarks of parties other than the mark owner resulted in infringement (normally, 
by causing actionable confusion).7 
Despite this focus, there are a large number of online intermediaries for whom 
the pertinent secondary liability standard is of concern, and the facilities that these 
intermediaries offer vary widely.8  This is something we need to keep in mind 
before extending the holdings from these cases uncritically to other intermediaries.9  
Likewise, the defendant in many of these cases is either eBay or Google.  But there 
is danger of constructing a regulatory regime for online intermediaries based on the 
capacities of these large companies, without proper regard for the different 
financial profile of small auction sites or small search engines. 
Finally, as is perhaps particularly apparent from the way that this Article has 
characterized the paradigmatic keyword cases, one could construct a claim of 
primary trademark infringement against the intermediaries involved.  The holdings 
on the primary liability question will be briefly mentioned within the discussion of 
those cases, because the availability of primary infringement liability clearly is 
relevant to the position one might wish to adopt regarding secondary liability.10  
 
 7. Some U.S. courts have recognized the possibility of claims for contributory dilution.  See 
Coach, Inc. v. Swap Shop, Inc., 916 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (summarizing authorities).  
However, the Ninth Circuit (rejecting the views of several lower courts) has recently denied the 
possibility of a claim for contributory cybersquatting.  See Petroliam Nasional Berhad v. GoDaddy.com, 
Inc., 737 F.3d 546 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 8. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 
2011) (Web hosting services).  And some, such as domain name registrars, benefit from provisions 
drafted in ways that confer limited immunity.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(iii) (West 2014) (“A domain 
name registrar, a domain name registry, or other domain name registration authority shall not be liable 
for damages under this section for the registration or maintenance of a domain name for another absent a 
showing of bad faith intent to profit from such registration or maintenance of the domain name.”); see 
also Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 648 (N.D. Tex. 2001). 
 9. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(allowing secondary infringement claim to proceed against credit card processing companies who 
provided services to online merchant allegedly selling counterfeit goods); but cf. Perfect 10, 494 F.3d 
788 (affirming dismissal of actions against credit card companies).  The importance of different 
intermediaries in securing effective enforcement may vary between different intellectual property rights.  
Trademark owners at present appear more interested in the cooperation of credit card processing 
companies than, for example, copyright owners.  But this may change over time depending upon the 
pattern of infringement practices. 
 10. The appropriate scope of secondary liability depends at least in part upon the appropriate 
scope of primary trademark liability.  See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 
1250 (10th Cir. 2013).  For example, if one thinks that protection against counterfeiting is less of a 
concern than conventionally thought, see Renée Richardson Gosline, Rethinking Brand Contamination:  
How Consumers Maintain Distinction when Symbolic Boundaries Are Breached (New England Mktg. 
Consortium, Working Paper, 2009); KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF 
ECONOMY:  HOW IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012), or thinks that post-sale confusion or 
confusion as to association should not be so readily actionable, see Jeremy Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 
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Indeed, that relationship may be quite close:  some scholars have characterized U.S. 
case law contemplating primary liability for search engine intermediaries as 
creating a “mutant” form of secondary liability.11 
I.  INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 
A.  TREATIES AND STATE-TO-STATE AGREEMENTS 
If one reads the term “international” to mean “as a matter of multilateral nation-
to-nation obligation,” international law does not have much to say regarding 
secondary liability for trademark infringement.  Nothing in the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) dictates any 
particular approach to secondary liability.  The trademark part of that agreement 
does not speak to the issue, and the enforcement provisions in TRIPS are stated 
with sufficient generality that they cannot be read to demand secondary liability, 
and certainly not any specific form of secondary liability.12  The Paris Convention 
(the leading pre-TRIPS treaty requiring substantive trademark protection) is 
similarly silent.13  That treaty does require protection against unfair competition, 
which is one way that certain countries might conceptualize what U.S. law calls 
secondary liability.  But the provision in question, Article 10bis, is understood to 
allow countries to implement that obligation with almost unfettered discretion.14  
Permitting trademark owners to sue direct infringers would seem a reasonable (if 
not always the most efficient) way of protecting rights, and that is enough to satisfy 
extant international obligations. 
TRIPS (like the Paris Convention, more obviously) was concluded without 
regard for the challenges of online activity.  Thus it is not surprising that it did not 
address the question of secondary liability, which has assumed far greater 
prominence in the Internet age.  And in the post-TRIPS climate, where political 
stalemate has resulted in limited multinational treaty making, nothing since TRIPS 
has advanced to an international position.  Within the World Intellectual Property 
 
MINN. L. REV. 769 (2012); Mark A. Lemley and Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 413 (2010), then that is likely to affect the appropriate scope of secondary liability for conduct 
facilitating such results.  At the most basic, it affects the extent of the cognizable harm that is potentially 
being enabled by intermediaries.  But for purposes of this Article, I am largely going to take primary 
trademark liability as is stands. 
 11. See Dogan, supra note 3, at 503. 
 12. The enforcement chapter of the Agreement requires members to ensure that “enforcement 
procedures as specified [in the Agreement] are available under their law so as to permit effective action 
against any act of infringement of intellectual property rights . . . including expeditious remedies to 
prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements.”  Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, The Legal Texts:  The Results of the Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; see The Law Applicable to 
Secondary Liability in Intellectual Property Cases, supra note 2, at 224 n.58. 
 13. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, last revised July 14, 
1967, last amended Sept. 28, 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
 14. See G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY 144 (BIRPI Geneva, 1968). 
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Organization (WIPO), the Standing Committee on the Law of Trade Marks did 
conduct an informational meeting in September 2012 to discuss the role and 
responsibility of intermediaries in the field of trademark law, a topic at the heart of 
secondary liability for online trademark infringement.15  However, opposition to 
making progress on that issue a priority was expressed by the European Union, 
among others, and three weeks later the Committee decided not to work further on 
the topic.16 
B.  MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
For some time before that 2012 debate at WIPO, EU member states might have 
thought that the ongoing negotiation of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA) would have been a viable alternative forum for the adoption of an 
international approach to online intermediary liability.17  But the scope of that 
agreement was scaled back over time and, in any event, by July 2012 the European 
Parliament had killed its European adoption when the Parliament refused to consent 
to EU ratification.18 
So, why might the European Union not have been keen to have an international-
level discussion within WIPO regarding this topic?  For the last few years, the 
European Commission has superintended a dialogue among more than thirty 
stakeholders consisting of brand owners and Internet platforms regarding their 
respective roles in tackling counterfeiting online.  And, in 2011, this led to the 
adoption of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which may now be the 
vehicle by which the European Union seeks to universalize its approach to this 
question.19 
 
 15. See World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Information Meeting on The Role and 
Responsibility of Internet Intermediaries in the Field of Trademarks, WIPO Doc. SCT/INFO/NET/ 
GE/12/INF/1 (Aug. 31, 2012). 
 16. See WIPO, Report of the Standing Committee on the Law of Trademarks, Industrial Designs 
and Geographical Indications, at ¶¶ 211−13, WIPO Doc. SCT/27/11 (Sept. 18−21, 2012). 
 17. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010, 50 I.L.M. 239, available at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147937.pdf [hereinafter ACTA]; cf. Con-
gressional Research Serv., The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (June 25, 2010), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/145583.pdf (offering another potential forum for developing 
international rules on online intermediary liability).  Early versions of ACTA sought to address online 
intermediary liability more fully (though this was driven largely by copyright law).  See Katja 
Weckström, Liability for Trademark Infringement for Internet Service Providers, 16 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2012); Margot Kaminski, Positive Proposals for Treatment of Online 
Intermediaries, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 203, 212 (2012). 
 18. See The Last ACTA:  Intellectual Property Treaty Dies in European Parliament, SPEIGEL 
ONLINE INT’L (July 4, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/acta-international-
property-treaty-voted-down-by-european-parliament-a-842583.html.  This was the first time that the 
Parliament had exercised its Lisbon Treaty power to reject an international trade agreement.  Press 
Release, European Parliament, European Parliament Rejects ACTA, Apr. 7, 2012, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20120703IPR48247/html/European-
Parliament-rejects-ACTA.  Five months later, the Commission formally signaled the end of EU efforts 
to ratify ACTA with the withdrawal of its request to the Court of Justice to consider the compatibility of 
the Agreement with the fundamental rights provisions of EU law. 
 19. Memorandum of Understanding on the Sale of Counterfeit Goods via the Internet, May 4, 
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The Commission has previously noted that such agreements can be more easily 
extended beyond the European Union.20  Indeed, the current U.S. administration 
had shown interest in the MOU in bilateral contacts with the EU.21  And in July 
2013, the “Commission inquired whether the global players among the [s]ignatories 
with operations in North America and Japan might be ready to progressively apply 
the MOU in those regions.”22  Signatories “responded positively” and agreed to 
give a reaction at the next meeting.23 
Moreover, this type of initiative is at one with the type of best practices model 
that seems to attract U.S. policymakers.  In July 2013, the U.S. Office of the 
Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator announced that a number of 
companies were adopting Best Practices Guidelines designed to reduce the flow of 
advertising revenue to infringing Web sites.24  There clearly is an appetite for 
voluntary agreements rather than treaty making.25 
Thus, it is worth looking at this memorandum.26  Of most interest, it arguably 
commits parties—which include Internet stalwarts such as eBay and Amazon, as 
well as brand owners—beyond obligations that might presently flow from hard law 
 
2011 [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding], available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
iprenforcement/docs/memorandum_04052011_en.pdf. 
 20. See European Comm’n, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament and the European Economic and Social Committee:  Enhancing the Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights in the Internal Market, ¶ 4.2, COM (2009) 467 final (Sept. 11, 2009), 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52009DC046. 
 21. European Comm’n, Memorandum of Understanding on the Sale of Counterfeit Goods via the 
Internet − Spring Meeting − 1 July 2013 − Summary, at 2, E.C. Doc. MARKT D3/FT/cm-
Ares(2013)2821695, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/mou_meeting 
_summary_20130701_en.pdf. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id.; see also Florina Telea, EU Observatory on the Infringement of IPR, Working Group on 
Enforcement, Memorandum of Understanding on the Sale of Counterfeit Goods via the Internet 
(PowerPoint Slides), at 9 (2014), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/ 
docs/022014-observatory-mou_en.pdf (noting goal of “developing MOU at the international level by 
including operators from third countries such as the US”). 
 24. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY SPOTLIGHT 2 (July/August 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
omb/IPEC/2013-us-ipec-joint-strategic-plan.pdf.  The signatories to the MOU have been discussing its 
possible extension to payment service providers.  See European Comm’n, Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Sale of Counterfeit Goods via the Internet − Autumn Meeting – 13 November 
2013 − Summary, at 4, E.C. Doc. MARKT D3/FT/cm-Ares(2013)3821568 [hereinafter November 2013 
Meeting Report], available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/summary-of-the-
autumn-meeting-20131113_en.pdf. 
 25. See Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts Panel Transcript:  Who’s Left Holding 
the [Brand Name] Bag?  Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet, 37 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 615, 617 (2014) (comments of Amy Cotton of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 
noting that several voluntary agreements were “percolating” in the United States and stating that “the 
industry setting the standards for what is reasonable, what is sustainable and what is a good business 
model, is really important”). 
 26. There are also MOUs (including some that apply outside Europe) between specific traders 
and platforms, such as that between Louis Vuitton and Taobao.com—a Chinese e-commerce site owned 
by Alibaba that is similar to Amazon or eBay.  See, e.g., Meng Jing, Taobao Steps up Fight Against 
Fake LV, CHINA DAILY USA (Nov. 11, 2013, 4:13 PM), http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-
10/11/ content_17025360.htm. 
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secondary liability standards.  The memorandum makes explicit that it does not 
replace or interpret the existing legal framework, and it cannot be used as evidence 
in legal proceedings.27  But it clearly has an eye to litigation.  The exchange of 
information contemplated by the MOU is not to constitute actual or constructive 
notice.28  And the parties to the MOU agreed to a one-year moratorium on lawsuits 
against each other regarding matters within the scope of the agreement.29 
So, what is that scope of the MOU?  As a matter of geography, the MOU is 
limited to the provision of services in the European Economic Area.30  And as a 
matter of substance, it addresses only counterfeit goods, rather than disputes about 
parallel imports or selective distribution systems.31  Moreover, the agreement does 
not address all intermediaries, only “providers whose service is used by third 
parties to initiate online the trading of physical goods.”32 
Notice and takedown procedures are central to the MOU, which is not surprising 
since the platforms all already operate them.33  The parties commit to continue 
operating such systems, but also agree to details that differ from the type of system 
that arguably now flows from hard law secondary liability rules.34  In particular, in 
addition to item-based notice and takedown, the agreement allows trademark 
owners to notify the platforms of sellers who are generally engaged in the sale of 
counterfeits, and the platforms will “take this information into consideration as part 
of their pro-active and preventive measures.”35  This is clearly an effort to move 
away from the specificity of notice that some case law may require to confer 
knowledge sufficient to establish secondary liability.36 
The MOU also tackles abuse of the notice and takedown system, an issue 
addressed in some statutory notice and takedown systems.37  Under the MOU, if a 
trademark owner makes notifications to an intermediary without exercising 
appropriate care, the owner may be denied future access to the system and must pay 
the platform any fees lost due to such notifications.38  And “sellers should be 
informed where an offer has been taken down, including the underlying reason, and 
be provided with the means to respond including the notifying party’s contact 
details.”39  These provisions are designed to ensure some balance in the system. 
Additionally, the MOU addresses what are called “[p]ro-active and [p]reventive 
 
 27. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 19, at 1. 
 28. Id. ¶¶ 22, 25. 
 29. Id. ¶ 10. 
 30. Id. at 1. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. ¶ 1(1). 
 33. Id. ¶¶ 11−12; see generally Mostert & Schwimmer, supra note 6. 
 34. See infra Part II for a discussion of both U.S. and European “hard law” secondary liability 
rules. 
 35. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 19, at ¶ 12. 
 36. See infra text accompanying notes 57−58. 
 37. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (West 2014) (imposing liability on “[a]ny person who knowingly 
materially represents . . . that material or activity is infringing” or “that material or activity was removed 
or disabled by mistake or misidentification”). 
 38. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 19, at ¶ 16. 
 39. Id. ¶ 19. 
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measures,” thus addressing the prevention of future infringement by ensuring that 
offers of counterfeit goods do not appear online.40  This commitment by the 
Internet platforms extends to “appropriate, commercially reasonable and 
technically feasible measures, taking into consideration [their] respective business 
models.”41  Examples revealed in later reports on the MOU include detection 
technologies and pre-emptive takedowns, or the vetting of some sellers prior to 
allowing them to sell online.42  As demonstrated below, this may be closer to hard 
European law, which in Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive contemplates 
future-looking measures.43  But, if extended to the United States, this would go 
beyond the prevailing view of current hard law obligations. 
The MOU carries with it the typical costs and benefits of private ordering.  To 
the extent that it precludes frequent and more concrete judicial development of the 
legal obligations under which intermediaries operate, it impedes a process that will 
over time inculcate greater certainty.  As a result, it is incumbent upon the 
Commission (which has superintended the adoption and implementation of the 
MOU) to continue to disseminate information about the practices developing 
thereunder, as it has done to date.  This will allow critical scrutiny, but also give to 
those practices some of the public-regarding value that attaches to judicial 
opinions.  Moreover, because the MOU is mostly operated by multinational 
companies,44 there is a risk that legal norms applicable to all actors grow up around 
the capacity and sophistication of large economic players—though this can also 
happen if litigation is the vehicle for development of the principles.  Again, public 
scrutiny is essential.45 
On the other hand, the MOU reduces costs by limiting litigation expenses and 
effectuating the lowest cost avoider principle to which, as discussed below, many 
countries are (with varying degrees of transparency) committed.  And, as the 
reports on the progress of the arrangement suggest, the private ordering process 
may offer a far greater chance of developing an international norm than negotiation 
of a multilateral instrument of a public international law character.  Finally, it 
would do so while retaining flexibility to adapt procedures to reflect both new 
forms of trading and changing technological capacity. 
 
 40. Id. ¶ 25. 
 41. Id. ¶ 27. 
 42. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Functioning 
of the Memorandum of Understanding on the Sale of Counterfeit Goods via the Internet, at 6, 11, COM 
(2013) 0209 final (Apr. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Report from the Commission], available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0209:FIN:EN:PDF. 
 43. See infra Part II.B.2.a.iii. 
 44. The existing signatories have begun to consider procedures for accession of new brand 
owners and platforms to the MOU.  See European Comm’n, Memorandum of Understanding on the Sale 
of Counterfeit Goods via the Internet − Spring Meeting – 1 April 2014 − Summary, at 1, E.C. Doc. 
MARKT D3/FT/cm-Ares(2013)1215882, available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ipr 
enforcement/docs/mou_meeting_summary_20140401_en.pdf.  
 45. See November 2013 Meeting Report, supra note 25, at 2−3 (discussing public availability of 
key performance indicators). 
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II.  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Practices under the MOU may be thought of as soft law, effectively creating 
international norms while there is little hard international law in the formal sense.  
But it remains a narrowly focused instrument, focusing on counterfeits.  So in 
painting the international landscape, this part of the Article will undertake a 
comparative analysis of national legal regimes that suggest models for adoption.  In 
particular, it will analyze U.S. and EU (particularly U.K.) law. 
A.  UNITED STATES LAW 
1.  Secondary Liability Standard 
Under U.S. law, the standard for secondary trademark infringement is facially 
very clear.  For participant-based liability, the standard remains that announced by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Inwood v. Ives.46  In Inwood, a defendant drug 
manufacturer sold look-alike generic drugs through pharmacists, some of whom 
committed primary infringement by passing the drug off as the branded version.47  
The plaintiff sued the generic drug manufacturer for secondary infringement.48  The 
Supreme Court held that: 
[I]f a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a trademark, 
or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is 
engaging in trademark infringement, the manufacturer or distributor is contributorially 
responsible for any harm done as a result of the deceit.49 
The Inwood test thus offers plaintiffs two avenues through which to establish 
secondary liability:  (1) intentional inducement and (2) continued supply with 
actual or constructive knowledge of infringement. 
2.  Applied to Auction Sites 
The most prominent application of Inwood in the online environment has been 
to assess the secondary liability of auction sites, such as eBay, for the listing of 
infringing items for sale on their Web sites.  In the United States, the leading action 
was brought by Tiffany.50  A “significant portion” of the Tiffany jewelry listed on 
the eBay Web site was counterfeit, and eBay knew that some portion of the Tiffany 
goods sold on its Web site might be counterfeit.51 
eBay itself implemented a number of measures to ensure the authenticity of 
products advertised on its site, and the court (significantly) set these out at great 
length.  For example, eBay:  (1) developed software—a so-called “fraud engine”—
 
 46. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982). 
 47. Id. at 849−50. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 854. 
 50. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 51. Id. at 98. 
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to ferret out illegal listings, including counterfeit goods; (2) maintained and 
administered the Verified Rights Owner (VeRO) Program, a notice and takedown 
system that allowed trademark owners to submit a Notice of Claimed Infringement 
(NOCI) to eBay identifying listings offering infringing items, so that eBay could 
remove them; (3) offered mark owners space on its site (an “About Me” page) to 
warn users about suspected fakes and (4) suspended hundreds of thousands of 
sellers each year it suspected of having engaged in infringing conduct.52  All in, 
these measures involved an expenditure of $20 million per year.53  Despite this, 
Tiffany brought an action against eBay inter alia for contributory infringement. 
Tiffany did not argue that eBay had induced the sale of counterfeit goods, and 
thus the case turned on the second prong of Inwood.54  As to that claim, eBay did 
not continue to supply its services to third-party sellers when Tiffany put it on 
actual notice of particular listings of counterfeit goods through submission of 
NOCIs.55  Indeed, eBay never refused to remove a reported Tiffany listing, and did 
so very quickly (within twenty-four hours, and typically within twelve hours).56 
Thus, Tiffany’s claim rested on the allegation that eBay had continued the 
provision of service for other listings, which, by virtue of its generalized 
knowledge of infringement on its Web site, it had “reason to know” were 
infringing.57  Essentially, the argument was that the widespread nature of 
infringement amounted to constructive knowledge.  However, the Second Circuit 
held that: 
For contributory trademark infringement liability to lie, a service provider must have 
more than a general knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to sell 
counterfeit goods.  Some contemporary knowledge of which particular listings are 
infringing or will infringe in the future is necessary.58 
If one took seriously the Second Circuit’s suggestion that the standard for 
secondary liability was derived from general principles of tort law,59 analysis of 
considerations commonly informing lowest cost avoider analysis might arguably 
 
 52. See id. at 98−100. 
 53. Id. at 98. 
 54. Both the district court and the Second Circuit applied the Inwood test, notwithstanding that 
the case involved the continued provision of services.  Following Ninth Circuit precedent in Lockheed 
Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1999), the district court held in 
Tiffany that “Inwood applies to a service provider who exercises sufficient control over the means of the 
infringing conduct,” and eBay satisfied this test because of the control it retained over the transactions 
and listings on its Web site.  Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 505−07.  Although amici challenged whether 
Inwood applied to services, eBay did not include this argument in its appeal and thus the Second Circuit 
did not reach that question.  See Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 106 (“On appeal, eBay no longer maintains that it is 
not subject to Inwood.”); see also id. at 105 n.10 (noting amici arguments).  Other cases have operated 
on the same assumption.  See, e.g., Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 55. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 106. 
 56. Id. at 99. 
 57. See id. at 103. 
 58. Id. at 107. 
 59. See id. at 103 (“Contributory trademark infringement is a judicially created doctrine that 
derives from the common law of torts.”). 
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have been relevant.60  Under such an approach, courts might take into account the 
fact that while brand owners may be best positioned to determine infringing 
conduct, intermediaries may be best positioned to implement preventive 
measures61—and, indeed, may have the expertise best to do so in technologically 
innovative ways, as many have done.62 
However, aspects of lowest cost avoider analysis might have influenced both the 
trial and appellate courts in Tiffany, despite their disavowals (explicit in the case of 
the lower court).63  The trial court spent substantial time discussing the sizeable 
efforts that eBay had made to detect and prevent infringement, and the Second 
Circuit noted the (purportedly irrelevant) record on this point.64  Moreover, both 
courts noted that eBay was hardly in a position to determine which Tiffany 
products were counterfeit and which were not, because it never saw or inspected 
the goods.65  But the ultimate doctrinal holding offered a narrower view of the 
knowledge requirement than found in some earlier cases involving brick-and-
 
 60. See Mark P. McKenna, Probabilistic Knowledge of Third-Party Trademark Infringement, 
2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 10, 26 (2011), available at http://journals.law.stanford.edu/ 
sites/default/files/stanford-technology-law-review-stlr/online/mckenna-probabilistic-knowledge.pdf.  
McKenna makes the point that “[i]f . . . courts were really to take seriously the tort law analogy, they 
would not treat cases involving probabilistic knowledge as secondary trademark infringement cases at 
all; they would treat them as negligence cases.”  Id.  So conceptualized, the U.S. approach might look 
less conceptually divergent from the approaches followed by some courts in continental Europe (as well 
as the forms of limited relief available under Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive).  See id. (“[I]f 
trademark secondary liability really derived from tort law, liability would exist in cases of probabilistic 
knowledge only when the defendant unreasonably failed to take precautions in the face of the known 
risk of infringement.  Unreasonableness would be measured, as it generally is in tort cases, by evaluating 
the probability of harm to the plaintiff and the potential magnitude of that harm, and comparing the 
product to the cost of the foregone precautions.  Secondary liability cases also would entail analysis of 
causation-in-fact and proximate causation . . . .”); see also infra text accompanying note 111 (liability 
under French law) and notes 151−180 (discussion of Article 11). 
 61. The involvement of intermediaries (sometimes as a result of mutually beneficial arrangements 
between the brand owner and intermediaries) can often be very effective.  See Kathy Chu & Joanne 
Chiu, To Woo Lux Brands, Alibaba Purges Resellers, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2014, at B1 (noting the  
effectiveness of intervention by Alibaba, the Chinese owner of the Tmall retail site, in reducing the 
number of counterfeit and gray market goods available on the site, and tying Alibaba’s intervention to a 
brand’s opening an official store on the Tmall site). 
 62. See Barton Beebe, Tiffany and Rosetta Stone:  Intermediary Liability in U.S. Trademark Law, 
Paper Delivered at UCL Institute of Brand and Innovation Law 5 (Feb. 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/ibil/docs/2012_beebe_paper.pdf (discussing the automated “counterfeit filter” 
used by Google to assess the bona fides of landing pages).  Intermediaries may also be able to 
implement measures that, while not preventing infringement, make their customers aware of potential 
trademark issues.  See Ginny Marvin, Google Keyword Planner Now Shows Trademarked Terms, 
SEARCH ENGINE LAND (Nov. 27, 2013), http://searchengineland.com/google-keyword-planner-now-
shows-trademarked-terms-178359. 
 63. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 518 (“Certainly, the evidence adduced at trial failed to prove that 
eBay was a cheaper cost avoider than Tiffany with respect to policing its marks.  But even more 
importantly, even if it were true that eBay is best situated to staunch the tide of trademark infringement 
to which Tiffany and countless other rights owners are subjected, that is not the law.”); cf. Tiffany, 600 
F.3d at 109 (noting, in response to the argument that mark holders could not bear the cost of 
enforcement, that, “[w]e could not, even if we thought it wise, revise the existing law in order to better 
serve one party’s interests at the expense of the other’s”).  
 64. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109. 
 65. Id. at 98−99.  
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mortar stores, and afforded little room for such considerations.66  The doctrine 
established a rather wooden, binary system.67  If the intermediary receives specific 
notice and does not act, it might be liable; otherwise, it is not. 
The Second Circuit did leave one opening for mark owners who had not given 
notice regarding individual listings, suggesting that willful blindness may satisfy 
the knowledge standard.68  The court did not find willful blindness in Tiffany 
merely because eBay knew generally that infringements were occurring on its site, 
and eBay did not ignore the information it was given.69  But this opening may still 
leave later courts with some room to reach a different result when a defendant with 
a less legitimate business model makes less reasonable efforts to prevent 
infringement. 
3.  Applied to Search Engines 
There has been less developed analysis by U.S. courts of the potential secondary 
liability of search engines for infringements committed by advertisers to whom 
they have sold keywords tied to the trademarks of others.  This is because most 
U.S. courts have analyzed the liability of such search engines as a matter of 
primary trademark infringement.70  The only substantial resistance to this occurred 
in the Second Circuit in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc.,71 and that circuit 
brought keyword advertising cases back within the primary infringement rubric in 
its 2009 Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc. decision.72 
 
 66. David H. Bernstein & Michael R. Potenza, Why the Reasonable Anticipation Standard Is the 
Reasonable Way to Assess Contributory Trademark Liability in the Online Marketplace, 2011 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 9 (2011). 
 67. Cf. Beebe, supra note 62, at 3. 
 68. Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 109−10 (“A service provider is not, we think, permitted willful blindness.  
When it has reason to suspect that users of its service are infringing a protected mark, it may not shield 
itself from learning of the particular infringing transactions by looking the other way.  . . . [W]illful 
blindness is equivalent to actual knowledge for purposes of the Lanham Act.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 69. Id. at 110 (“eBay appears to concede that it knew as a general matter that counterfeit Tiffany 
products were listed and sold through its website.  Without more, however, this knowledge is 
insufficient to trigger liability under Inwood.  . . .  eBay did not ignore the information it was given 
about counterfeit sales on its website.”). 
 70. Of course, as was made quite explicit in many of these opinions, search engines are only 
potentially liable for primary infringements; liability depends upon a plaintiff proving actionable 
confusion.  To date, search engines have been successful in resisting such claims, usually after trial of 
the confusion question but on occasion as a matter of summary judgment (in several different courts).  
See, e.g., Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 
2005) (finding for defendant search engine because no likelihood of confusion was proved at trial); see 
also Eric Goldman, Google Defeats Trademark Challenge to Its AdWords Service, FORBES ONLINE 
(Oct. 22, 2012, 12:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/10/22/google-defeats-
trademark-challenge-to-its-adwords-service (“In a remarkable litigation tour-de-force, Google has never 
definitively lost any of these cases in court (though it has occasionally lost intermediate rulings).”).  At 
some point, the accretion of such pro-defendant rulings may establish a harder rule of law immunizing 
search engines from primary liability. 
 71. See 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 72. See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009); cf. Kelly-Brown v. 
Winfrey, 717 F.3d 295 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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The conduct of the search engines can of course be characterized very much like 
that of the auction sites against whom secondary liability has been the principal 
claim.73  Indeed, in the European Union secondary liability is the only basis on 
which mark owners can hold search engines liable for this conduct as a matter of 
trademark law.74  Moreover, from the mark owner’s perspective, suing the search 
engine has the same strategic benefits as the secondary infringement claims against 
eBay.  And, as with eBay, search engines have developed policies under which 
they will, in certain circumstances, disable advertisements upon notice from a 
trademark owner.75 
Finally, the reasons proffered by the Second Circuit in Rescuecom for 
distinguishing its prior 1-800 Contacts decision reek of the considerations that 
inform analysis of secondary infringement claims:  to what extent did Google’s 
Keyword Suggestion Tool effectively induce the primary infringing conduct, and to 
what extent did the selling by Google of particular marks affect the level of 
contribution and causality relevant to Google’s culpability?76  Certainly, these do 
not seem questions typically relevant to primary infringement analysis.  Indeed, this 
disjunction has caused Stacey Dogan to label the Rescuecom-endorsed cause of 
action as a “curious branch of direct trademark infringement designed to 
distinguish between the innocent intermediary and one whose technology and 
 
 73. There may be certain conduct of the search engine that causes confusion wholly independent 
of the content of particular advertisements, such as the way in which search results are presented on the 
search results page.  Cf. Stacey L. Dogan, “We Know It When We See It”:  Intermediary Trademark 
Liability and the Internet, 2011 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 7, 19 (2011).  One may ask, for example, whether 
there is clear differentiation of purchased advertising and so-called organic listings, and whether 
advertisements are clearly labeled as such.  Cf. Directive 2000/31, of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular 
Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, art. 6(a), 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 11 (EC) [hereinafter E-
Commerce Directive] (clear labeling of advertisements).  To assess the actionability of that type of 
conduct under trademark law requires both a normative inquiry about the type of confusion best 
remedied by private trademark litigation, and a willingness to reconfigure a multifactor test for 
likelihood of confusion designed for quite different fact patterns.  The former question might take into 
account the relative merits of consumer protection proceedings.  Cf. Google Inc. v Austl. Competition 
and Consumer Comm’n [2013] HCA 1 (Austl.). The latter should not be controversial given that such 
tests are meant simply to be vehicles to assist in making ultimate determinations, and such 
reconfigurations have taken place in other contexts such as nominative fair use.  See, e.g., Toyota Motor 
Sales U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2010).  However, the sanctity of traditional 
multifactor tests is something on which different courts take different views.  Compare Network 
Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1145 (9th Cir. 2011) (factors 
intended as “adaptable proxy”), with Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628 (9th Cir. 2008).  The 
trend in recent years would appear to support adaptation.  See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, 
Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1243−44 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 74. See infra text accompanying notes 111−120. 
 75. See, e.g., AdWords Trademark Policy, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/adwordspolicy/ 
answer/6118?hl=en (last visited Feb. 20, 2014). 
 76. See Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 129.  On this latter point, the Second Circuit distinguished 
between the practice of the defendant in 1-800 Contacts, which had sold advertising keyed to categories 
of marks (e.g., selling the right to have an advertisement appear when a user searches for a mark 
connected to eye care products, but not disclosing to the advertiser the proprietary mapping of marks 
and categories), and that of Google (which sold advertising tied directly to single marks).  See id. at 
128−29. 
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business model deliberately seek to confuse.”77 
Assessing culpability of search engines under primary infringement standards 
does not appear to be altering the pro-defendant outcomes that one would expect as 
a matter of secondary infringement under Tiffany.  On the whole, search engines 
are prevailing.  To be sure, Google could (even under the Tiffany standard) be held 
contributorily liable if an advertiser is found to be primarily infringing and Google, 
after notice, does not disable the advertisement.  The frequency of that will, 
however, depend upon evolving case law on advertiser liability, which also seems 
still to be largely pro-defendant.78 
There have been occasional (temporary) victories for plaintiffs against search 
engines under a secondary liability standard.  The most notable of these in the past 
eighteen months was the Fourth Circuit’s reversal of the district court decision in 
Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., which had dismissed the primary and secondary 
infringement claims against Google.79  But even this decision does not portend 
substantial risk to search engines.  On the primary infringement claim, the Fourth 
Circuit reversed largely because the lower court had performed some unduly 
creative doctrinal twists that were barely concealed efforts to revive the trademark 
use doctrine.80  On the secondary infringement claim, the Fourth Circuit articulated 
a reading of the Inwood standard regarding knowledge that is very much in line 
with the Second Circuit’s standard in Tiffany: 
It is not enough to have general knowledge that some percentage of the purchasers of 
a product or service is using it to engage in infringing activities; rather, the defendant 
must supply its product or service to “identified individuals” that it knows or has 
reason to know are engaging in trademark infringement.81 
To meet this standard, the plaintiff argued that Google had allowed “known 
infringers and counterfeiters” to bid on the Rosetta Stone marks as keywords after 
Rosetta Stone had notified Google of two hundred instances of sponsored links that 
led to Web sites offering counterfeits.82  The Fourth Circuit reversed the grant of 
summary judgment to Google, but only because the lower court’s reliance on the 
comparative level of knowledge in Tiffany failed to account for the different 
procedural posture of the Rosetta Stone case.83  According to the Fourth Circuit, 
 
 77. Dogan, supra note 73, at 19. 
 78. See, e.g., J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. P’ship v. Settlement Funding L.L.C., No. 06-0597, 
2007 WL 30115 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007) (awarding summary judgment to defendant purchaser of 
keywords on question of confusion); Network Automation, 638 F.3d 1137; cf. 1-800 Contacts, 722 F.3d 
1229. 
 79. Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152−60 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 80. On the trademark use debate, see Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark 
Law Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669 (2007); Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, 
Confusion over Use:  Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597 (2007).  To be sure, the 
Fourth Circuit also applies the multifactor confusion test in an unimaginative manner.  See Dogan, supra 
note 3, at 520–21.  But there is no reason why the test cannot be adapted if actionable confusion is 
alleged.  See supra note 73. 
 81. Rosetta Stone, 676 F.3d at 163. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 164−65 (noting that Tiffany had been decided after an extensive bench trial, unlike 
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there was at least a factual question as to whether Google “continued to supply its 
services to known infringers.”84  Although there is perhaps some ambiguity in the 
court’s opinion,85 on balance, the Fourth Circuit suggests that generalized 
knowledge will be of no relevance to the question of secondary liability. 
As with auction sites, the upshot of current case law is a notice and takedown 
system that will be operated by search engines to immunize themselves from 
liability, although one can predict further liberalizations of search engine policies 
unless advertisers start being held primarily liable for keyword advertising. 
4.  Application of Tiffany and Rosetta Stone 
The Tiffany court rejected efforts by Tiffany and several amici to establish a 
secondary liability standard (derived from the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition) that would have required an intermediary to take reasonable 
precautions to prevent infringement by the direct infringers when it could 
reasonably anticipate that infringements would occur.86  Such an approach would 
allow an obligation to act to be triggered by generalized knowledge, but the extent 
of that obligation would then be determined by considerations of reasonableness.  
Adoption of that position might have required the Second Circuit to align itself 
with arguments that the Supreme Court had appeared to reject in Inwood.87  But, as 
the Tiffany court noted, the Supreme Court precedent was hardly constraining on 
the knowledge question.88  And the generalized knowledge standard does seem to 
 
Rosetta Stone). 
 84. Id. at 165. 
 85. See id. at 163 (“The district court recognized that Rosetta Stone had come forward with 
evidence relevant to its contributory infringement claim.  The most significant evidence in this regard 
reflected Google’s purported allowance of known infringers and counterfeiters to bid on the Rosetta 
Stone marks as keywords . . . .”); see also infra text accompanying notes 97−99. 
 86. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 109−10 (2d Cir. 2010); see RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 27 (1995) ( “[Contributory liability attaches when] the actor fails to 
take reasonable precautions against the occurrence of the third person’s infringing conduct in 
circumstances in which the infringing conduct can be reasonably anticipated.”). 
 87. Reading Inwood is complicated by the fact that Justice White’s concurring opinion ascribes to 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion a treatment of the lower court’s opinion that she herself disclaimed.  In 
particular, Justice White expressed concern that the majority was endorsing a knowledge standard based 
on whether the defendant “could reasonably have anticipated” the third parties’ infringing conduct; 
Justice O’Connor explicitly rejected this charge.  Compare Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 
U.S. 844, 854 n.13 (1982) (O’Connor, J.) (rejecting Justice White’s concern that the majority opinion 
endorsed any change to the contributory infringement test), with id. at 859−60 (White, J., concurring) 
(“The mere fact that a generic drug company can anticipate that some illegal substitution will occur to 
some unspecified extent, and by some unknown pharmacists, should not by itself be a predicate for 
contributory liability.  I thus am inclined to believe that the Court silently acquiesces in a significant 
change in the test for contributory infringement.”). 
 88. It is worth noting the extent to which the Second Circuit felt that Inwood spoke to the precise 
question before the Tiffany court.  The court opened its opinion by noting the “paucity of case law to 
guide us” and the fact that the few cases decided in the Second Circuit contained little detail, leaving the 
“law of contributory trademark infringement ill-defined.”  Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 103, 105.  And the 
Supreme Court in Inwood only applied the inducement prong of the test, so one could even regard what 
Inwood said about the continued supply prong to be dicta; indeed, the Second Circuit acknowledged that 
Inwood did not “establish[] the contours of the ‘knows or has reason to know’ prong.”  Id. at 108.  Yet 
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comport with the approach adopted by many courts in the offline environment.89 
Some scholars have suggested that, despite the narrowness of the doctrinal 
language in Tiffany, the Second Circuit may have effectively decided the case 
based upon an assessment of the reasonableness of the measures adopted by 
eBay.90  Certainly, the court’s recitation of eBay’s efforts to detect and limit 
infringement hints at an approach more sensitive to individual context than the 
doctrinal holding suggests.91  And this sensitivity would be valuable, because the 
legitimacy of the behavior of intermediaries occupies a spectrum that requires 
greater flexibility (and room for more subtle calibration) than formal secondary 
liability doctrine might seem to allow.92  Indeed, such flexibility is necessary also 
to account for the different demands that might be imposed on smaller entities 
without the capital or sophistication of eBay.93 
Openly assessing the reasonableness of intermediary behavior might at some 
level appear to be a more genuine engagement with a tort-grounded notion of 
secondary liability.94  It might also provide greater comfort to mark owners, who 
see preventative and prospective measures as more useful in fighting infringement 
than the specific notice and takedown regime that Tiffany appears to establish as the 
almost exclusive device for affording assistance.95 
 
the Court’s conclusion turned to some extent on a very careful parsing of the language of the Inwood 
test, which referenced supply to “one” whom the defendant knew was engaging in infringement, and on 
dicta in Sony that ventured a guess as to how that case would have come out under Inwood as opposed to 
the copyright standard.  See id. at 108−09.  Certainly, the court’s protestations about judicial 
circumspection—that “we are interpreting the law and applying it to the facts of this case [and] could 
not, even if we thought it wise, revise the existing law in order to better serve one party’s interests at the 
expense of the other’s”—do seem a little strained given the room for maneuver that appeared to exist.  
Id. at 109. 
 89. See, e.g., Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996).  Indeed, 
this approach in offline cases does not seem to have been altered by the Tiffany opinion.  See Coach, Inc. 
v. Goodfellow, 717 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 90. See Dogan, supra note 3, at 509 n.38 (noting that judicial assessment of whether the 
intermediary is in a position where it can stop infringement and can reasonably be required to do so is 
“often implicit” and channeled “through doctrinal standards of ‘knowledge’ and ‘substantial 
assistance’”); cf. Beebe, supra note 62, at 4 (“[W]ho . . . doubts that if eBay had done nothing to 
minimize counterfeit sales, the Second Circuit would have found contributory liability, as federal courts 
routinely have for flea market operators, whether these operators had general knowledge, actual 
knowledge, constructive knowledge, or something else?  One is tempted to say that the issue was 
ultimately not so much one of negligence as of who would be the lowest-cost enforcer of the right.”). 
 91. See Dogan, supra note 3, at 516 (“The [Tiffany] opinion suggested—without holding—that 
eBay’s generalized knowledge of widespread counterfeiting required it to do something to facilitate the 
detection and removal of counterfeit goods.  The problem with Tiffany’s argument was that eBay had 
done something; indeed, it had done quite a lot.”). 
 92. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster Goats:  
Reckoning the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepreneurs, 50 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 577 (2008) (noting the need for copyright law to have tools by which to recognize the different 
culpability of a range of intermediaries even though all operate dual purpose technologies).   
 93. Cf. Mostert & Schwimmer, supra note 6, at 264–65 (speculating as to some of the 
misjudgments that might have prompted the lack of responsiveness of the defendant in Louis Vuitton 
Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
 94. See supra text accompanying notes 60−62. 
 95. See Report from the Commission, supra note 42, at 6, 11.  
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Certainly, actions against online intermediaries post-Tiffany have been more 
favorable to mark owners than the narrow holding of that case would perhaps have 
portended.  For example, in Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict of over $10 million against a Web hosting 
business that leased, inter alia, server space to customers trafficking in counterfeit 
goods.96  In that case, the defendant (a small company) failed to respond 
expeditiously to takedown requests, and thus fell afoul of Tiffany because it had 
received actual notice.  And although the language of the Fourth Circuit in Rosetta 
Stone appeared to mimic the specific knowledge requirement of Tiffany, the fact 
that the Fourth Circuit contemplated possible liability based upon allowing “known 
infringers and counterfeiters” to bid again on the Rosetta Stone marks suggested a 
slight loosening of the specificity requirement beyond an item-by-item (or listing-
by-listing) takedown system.97  If so, this would be an implicit acknowledgment of 
some of the attractions of a so-called “takedown and stay down” policy,98 and 
would move closer to the enhancements of the notice and takedown system 
contemplated by the MOU (and possibly European law).99 
A recent decision of the Tenth Circuit may best reflect this evolution of the 
 
 96. Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 941 (9th Cir. 2011); 
see also Order re Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 9, Chloé SAS v. Sawabeh Info. 
Servs. Co., No. CV-11-4147-GAF (MANx), 2012 WL 7679386 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2013) (copy on file 
with author). 
 97. See also Dogan, supra note 3, at 517 (discussing Tiffany (NJ) LLC v. Dong, No. 11 Civ. 
2183(GBD)(FM), 2013 WL 4046380 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2013)); cf. Order re Plaintiffs’ Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, supra note 96, at 14 (issuing order against business-to-consumer Web sites 
found to be contributorily liable requiring them to “monitor their websites on an ongoing basis for 
compliance and must upon written notice remove or disable access to any listing that plaintiffs identify 
as infringing or that otherwise comes to defendants’ attention as infringing plaintiffs’ marks”).  It is a 
long-standing principle of U.S. trademark law that one found liable for infringement might be required 
to forego certain activities (normally with regard to the uses of the mark at issue in the litigation) that 
might be found legitimate if conducted by innocent parties.  See Taubman Co. v. Webfeats, 319 F.3d 
770, 779 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting the so-called “safe distance rule” to the effect that “a competitive 
business, once convicted of unfair competition in a given particular, should thereafter be required to 
keep a safe distance away from the margin line—even if that requirement involves a handicap as 
compared with those who have not disqualified themselves.” (quoting Broderick & Bascom Rope Co. v. 
Manoff, 41 F.2d 353, 354 (6th Cir. 1930))). 
 98. Within the European Union, some national courts have taken the view that an obligation for 
providers of hosting services to prevent the reappearance of contents they have already taken down 
(“notice and stay down”) might amount to a general monitoring obligation prohibited by Article 15 of 
the E-Commerce Directive.  See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., 
July 12, 2012, Bull. civ. I, No. 167 (Fr.) (Google Inc. v. Bac Films); Cass. 1e civ., July 12, 2012, Bull. 
civ. I, No. 166 (Fr.) (Google Inc. v. Bac Films); Cass. 1e civ., July 12, 2012, Bull. civ. I, No. 162 (Fr.) 
(consolidated appeals, Google Inc. & Aufeminin.com v. André Rau, H & K); see also Christine Gateau & 
Pauline Faron, Take Down, Stay Down:  Paris Court of Appeal Confirms Hosting Providers Have No 
General Monitoring Obligation, 20 COMPUTER & TELECOMM. L. REV. 12 (2014) (U.K.) (discussing 
Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 2e civ., June 21, 2013 (Fr.) (Societe des Producteurs 
de Phonogrammes en France v. Google) (unpublished)).   
 99. See Annette Kur, Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement on the Internet:  The 
Situation in Germany and Throughout the EU, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 525 (2014) (noting that German 
courts applying the Störerhaftung doctrine to Internet auction sites “did not confine [filtering] duties to 
future identical offers made by the same person, but extended them to infringements that were 
essentially of the same character”). 
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Tiffany court’s approach.100  In 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., the plaintiff 
mark owner brought an action, inter alia for contributory infringement, against a 
competitor whose affiliate had engaged in the alleged acts of primary infringement:  
namely, the purchase of keywords consisting of the marks of the plaintiff.101  The 
plaintiff filed a complaint in federal court against the defendant that included 
screen shots of an allegedly offending advertisement, but the plaintiff did not 
identify which of the defendant’s ten thousand affiliates had purchased it.102  It took 
the defendant three months to take corrective action against the affiliate in 
question.103  The Tenth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment against the 
plaintiff on its claim of contributory infringement because “a rational juror could 
find that [the defendant] knew that at least one of its affiliates was [engaging in 
infringement] yet did not make reasonable efforts to halt the affiliate’s practice.”104  
According to the court, the defendant had an effective tool to stop infringement 
(sending out a notice to all affiliates instructing them not to purchase the keyword 
in question) but did not use it.105  This duty, according to the court, arose even 
though the defendant did not know the specific identity of the alleged infringer.  A 
jury could find that this would have been “reasonable action” to take:  the court 
would not insist on a “rigid line requiring knowledge of [an infringer’s specific] 
identity, so long as the remedy does not interfere with lawful conduct.”106 
However, this evolution remains something short of the “reasonable 
anticipation” standard that Tiffany had urged on the Second Circuit, or a full-blown 
lowest cost avoider analysis consistent with a tort based approach to secondary 
liability.  Those alternative approaches might impose on intermediaries a greater 
obligation to engage in affirmative steps to prevent future infringement (depending 
upon assessment of costs and benefits).  As Stacey Dogan astutely notes, the 
implicit reasonableness analysis that can be discerned in U.S. case law to date does 
not go that far:  the cases are converging around a principle of “reasonableness in 
receiving and responding to specific notices of infringement.”107  That is to say: 
The “reasonableness” principle seems—albeit implicitly—to be pursuing a modified 
“best-cost-avoider” strategy:  it places responsibility for infringement detection and 
elimination with the party best positioned to accomplish each task.  Detection falls on 
the intellectual property owner, who is best suited to recognize unauthorized versions 
of its work or trademark. Responsibility for terminating the infringement, in turn, rests 
on the intermediary, assuming that it has control over the means used to infringe.  If 
the structure of a defendant’s system and its relationship to infringers gives it the 
power to stop them without threatening lawful use, then the law requires it to exercise 
 
 100. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1249–55 (10th Cir. 2013).  
 101. Id. at 1234. 
 102. Id. at 1252. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 1254. 
 107. Dogan, supra note 3, at 509. 
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that power.108 
Dogan uses the phrase “modified ‘best-cost-avoider’ strategy” to describe this 
position because “a pure best-cost-avoider approach would take system design into 
account and require intermediaries to take reasonable steps to head off infringement 
before it occurs.”109  It might also be called “lowest-cost-terminator,” insofar as it 
retains an essentially backwards-looking posture.  As we shall see below in Part 
II.B., in this regard, even the post-Tiffany system does not provide mark owners in 
the United States with the full forms of assistance to which they may be entitled in 
the European Union. 
B.  EUROPEAN UNION LAW 
1.  Primary liability 
Similar claims have been brought against Google and eBay (and other search 
engines and auction sites) for almost identical conduct in a number of European 
countries.  These claims included allegations of primary and secondary trademark 
infringement, although in some countries the secondary infringement claims were 
denominated or even conceptualized differently.  In France, for example, what 
looked like a secondary infringement claim against eBay was in fact advanced as a 
direct violation of the general fault provision in the Civil Code.110  But the core 
question was the same as the one substantively implicated by the Tiffany case in 
New York:  How is one to assess the reasonableness of the behavior of the 
intermediary given its level of specific and general knowledge of infringing activity 
on its site?111 
Initially, both types of fact patterns—search engine and auction site cases—
produced varying results around Europe, in part perhaps because of the different 
conceptualization of the claims advanced by plaintiffs.  In particular, tort law 
generally has not been harmonized in the European Union (and development of 
unfair competition law was specifically reserved to member states despite 
harmonization of registered trademark law).  But the Court of Justice of the 
European Union has imposed some degree of commonality throughout Europe via 
two decisions, handed down in 2010 and 2011:  Google France SARL v. Louis 
Vuitton Malletier SA (on reference from the French courts) and L’Oréal SA v. eBay 
International AG (on reference from the U.K. courts).112  These cases now establish 
the doctrinal framework for considering these types of claims, but for reasons 
discussed below there is still not a uniform position throughout the European 
Union. 
 
 108. Id. at 11−12. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See e.g., Tribunal de commerce [TC] [court of trade] Paris, June 30, 2008, No. 200677799, 
11−12 (Fr.) (Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. eBay, Inc.). 
 111. Cf. Dogan, supra note 3, at 503 (characterizing the driving concerns in Tiffany). 
 112. See Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011; Joined Cases C-
236/08−C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417. 
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In Google France, the court held that a search engine is not involved in the type 
of use that can give rise to primary trademark liability under EU trademark law 
simply by selling keyword advertising that consists of the trademark of another.113  
Only uses by a search engine “in its own commercial communication” would fall 
within the proscription of trademark law; the court found that this was not the case 
with the sale of keyword advertising.114 
Although this limited the liability of search engines that sold the keyword 
advertising, the court did not rule out liability for the advertisers that purchased 
that advertising.  Indeed, the Google France court adopted a relatively protective 
standard to be applied in cases brought against advertisers.115  Although the results 
of cases brought in national courts under that standard have been mixed, plaintiffs 
have met with slightly greater success in their claims against advertisers in Europe 
than they have in the United States,116 notwithstanding an attempt by the Court of 
Justice in its subsequent Interflora, Inc. v. Marks & Spencer PLC decision to reflect 
concerns of enhanced competition and consumer choice by modifying slightly the 
primary infringement standard announced in Google France.117 
In L’Oréal, the Court of Justice reached a similar result regarding the primary 
liability of auction sites, holding that eBay does not “use” the trademarks that its 
clients use in their advertisements on the eBay Web site.118  Thus, in both cases 
involving online intermediaries, the Court of Justice took a narrower view of the 
scope of primary infringement, approximating (if not quite reaching) the position 
advocated by proponents of the trademark use doctrine in the United States.119  As 
 
 113. Google France, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417, ¶ 55.  
 114. Id. ¶¶ 55–56. 
 115. See id. ¶ 84 (finding liability under Article 5(1)(a) of the Trademark Directive if “the ad does 
not enable normally informed and reasonably attentive internet users, or enables them only with 
difficulty, to ascertain whether the goods or services referred to by the ad originate from the proprietor of 
the trade mark or an undertaking economically connected to it or, on the contrary, originate from a third 
party”) (emphasis added).  And although the court formally left the assessment of confusion to national 
courts on a case-by-case basis, it clearly suggested liability in a potentially broad range of 
circumstances.  The court appeared more concerned with the EU policy on “transparency in the display 
of advertisements on the internet,” id. ¶ 86, than with the potentially competing value of competition 
embodied in EU comparative advertising legislation.  Id. ¶¶ 70–71. 
 116. See, e.g., OGH, June 21, 2010, docket No. 17 Ob 3/10f, in 2/2010 GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT, INTERNATIONALER TEIL [GRUR Int’l] 173 (2010) (Austria) (Die 
BergSpechte Outdoor Reisen und Alpinschule Edi Koblmüller GmbH v. Guni) (finding liability under 
both Article 5(1)(a) and 5(1)(b)); Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer PLC, [2013] EWHC 1291 (Ch) 
(Eng.) (finding in favor of plaintiff where defendant purchased keyword advertising using plaintiff’s 
trademarked name); Cosmetic Warriors Ltd. v Amazon.co.uk Ltd., [2014] EWHC 181 (Ch) (Eng.) 
(finding liability as a result of adverse effect on both origin and investment function of marks); 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] June 27, 2013, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ 
UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 182, 2013 (Ger.) (Fleurop) (reaching similar conclusion to the U.K. court 
in Interflora based in large part upon the network nature of the claimant’s service); see also Birgit Clark, 
Fleurop:  When Keyword Advertising May Exceptionally Be a Trade Mark Infringement After All, 9 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 693 (2014) (U.K.) (discussing Fleurop).  
 117. See Case C-323/09, Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer PLC, 2011 E.C.R. I-8664. 
 118. Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 102. 
 119. See Case Comment, Trademark Law—Infringement Liability—European Court of Justice 
Holds that Search Engines Do Not Infringe Trademarks:  Joined Cases C-236/08, C-237/08 & C-
238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 119 (Mar. 23, 
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a result, intermediary liability of auction sites and search engines could only be 
assessed under other rubrics, including secondary infringement or accessorial 
liability, and these claims were left to be determined under national law.120 
2.  Secondary Liability and Article 11 Relief 
Member states of the European Union have adopted quite disparate approaches 
to the question of secondary liability.  Prior to the L’Oréal v. eBay judgment of the 
Court of Justice, the results in cases against auction sites had occupied a broad 
spectrum.  The most favorable to trademark plaintiffs were a couple of early French 
cases that held eBay liable.121  The principal basis for such liability was the general 
French law of torts, which allowed French courts to hold intermediaries liable 
based upon a finding that they had disregarded a duty to act reasonably.122  But 
courts in several other countries, including the United Kingdom, appeared 
unwilling to impose liability upon the auction site based upon merely facilitating 
infringement.  The German courts had adopted a middle ground, and were willing 
to offer the claimants limited injunctive relief—essentially mandating takedown, 
but potentially requiring some pro-active filtering for infringements—based upon a 
German remedial doctrine discussed below, but resisting full liability claims absent 
specific and concrete knowledge of the allegedly infringing acts.123 
 
2010), 124 HARV. L. REV. 648, 652–53 n.50 (2010) [hereinafter Case Comment] (noting that the Court 
of Justice is unlikely to embrace a full trademark use rule given its prior decisions, such as Arsenal v. 
Reed (Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football Club plc v. Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10273)). 
 120. See Google France, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417, ¶¶ 114, 141.  There are no proposals to make it a 
matter of European law in the current revision of the Directive and the Regulation.  See MAX PLANCK 
INST. FOR INTELLECTUAL PROP. AND COMPETITION LAW, STUDY ON THE OVERALL FUNCTIONING OF 
THE EUROPEAN TRADE MARK SYSTEM ¶¶ 2.219–2.220 (2011), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/indprop/docs/tm/20110308_allensbach-study_en.pdf; Proposal for a Directive of the 
European Parliament and of the Council to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to 
Trade Marks, COM (2013) 162 final (Mar. 27, 2013), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0162:FIN:EN:PDF; Proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council Amending Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 on the 
Community Trade Mark, COM (2013) 161 final (Mar. 27, 2013), available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0161:FIN:EN:PDF. 
 121. See, e.g., TC Paris, June 30, 2008, No. 200677799, 11−12 (Fr.) (Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. 
v. eBay, Inc.) (unpublished); Tribunal de grande instance [TGI] Troyes, civ., June 4, 2008, No. 060264 
(Fr.) (Hermés Int’l v. eBay, Inc.) (unpublished). 
 122. Matthias Leistner, Structural Aspects of Secondary (Provider) Liability in Europe, 9 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 75, 86 (2014). 
 123. See Kur, supra note 99, at 532; Leistner, supra note 122, at 78–82 (discussing German law); 
see also BGH Mar. 11, 2004, 158 BUNDESGERICHTSHOFS IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 236 (Ger.) (Internet 
Auction I), translated in 2005 EUR. TRADE MARK REP. 25; BGH Apr. 19, 2007, 172 BGHZ 119 (Ger.) 
(Internet Auction II), translated in 2007 EUR. TRADE MARK REP. 70.  The clarity of the German position 
with regard to liability for trademark infringement is somewhat muddied by a line of case law 
proceeding under the general clause (Section 3) of the German Unfair Competition law.  See Kur, supra 
note 99, at 532; Leistner, supra note 122, at 80.  Insofar as such a claim conceptualizes the liability of 
the intermediary as an autonomous tort, it comes closer to the French approach.  See Case Comment, 
supra note 121. 
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a.  L’Oréal v. eBay (U.K. and ECJ) 
To explore the complex interaction of national and EU law that now combines 
to define a EU position, this Article will focus on the L’Oréal v. eBay case before 
Mr. Justice Arnold in the United Kingdom—the case that made its way to the Court 
of Justice.124  L’Oréal made several claims against eBay.  In addition to the direct 
trademark infringement claims that were dismissed under EU trademark law 
(mentioned in Part II.B.1. above) L’Oréal argued that eBay was accessorially liable 
for the infringements allegedly committed by the sellers of goods who unlawfully 
used L’Oréal marks in their listings.125  And, finally, L’Oréal argued that it was 
entitled to relief under Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive even if eBay was 
not itself liable (whether primarily or as an accessory) for trademark 
infringement.126 
i.  Accessorial Liability 
Mr. Justice Arnold held that under U.K. law accessorial liability requires a 
common design or procurement of an infringement by inducement, incitement or 
persuasion: 
Mere assistance, even knowing assistance, does not suffice to make the “secondary” 
party liable as a joint tortfeasor with the primary party.  What he does must go further.  
He must have conspired with the primary party or procured or induced his 
commission of the tort . . . ; or he must have joined in the common design pursuant to 
which the tort was committed . . . .127 
This common design test, which reflects long-standing English common law of 
torts, is a hard standard to satisfy.128  Mere knowledge on the part of the supplier of 
equipment that it might probably be used to infringe does not make out the 
plaintiff’s case, not even when combined with facilitation; facilitation is not 
procurement.  Consistent with the approach in the United States, whether eBay had 
taken all possible, reasonable steps was not formally the issue.  Ultimately, 
although Mr. Justice Arnold expressed some sympathy for the suggestion that eBay 
could have insured against the risk of infringement, he suggested that he would 
come down on eBay’s side on the question.129 
 
 124. See L’Oréal S.A. v. eBay Int’l AG, [2009] EWHC 1094 (Ch) (Eng.). 
 125. See id. at [24].  
 126. Id. at [31]. 
 127. Id. at [350] (quoting Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland NV v. Export Credit Guarantee Dep’t, 
[1997] EWCA (Civ) 2165, [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 19, [48] (Eng.)). 
 128. Though it is not unheard of, it is most commonly satisfied by facts that are different from the 
facilitation scenario.  See, e.g., Cosmetic Warriers Ltd. v. Amazon.co.uk, [2014] EWHC 181 (Ch) (Eng.) 
(holding a U.K. and a Luxembourg entity jointly liable since they “joined together and agreed to work 
together in the furtherance of a common plan”). 
 129. L’Oréal, [2009] EWHC 1094, [359]−[72]. 
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ii.  E-Commerce Directive 
U.K. courts are at one end of the European spectrum on secondary infringement 
standards, imposing a very high threshold to establish accessorial liability.130  
Given the early French decisions, one might think that there is an intolerable and 
surprising divergence of secondary liability standards governing the conduct of 
Internet intermediaries in the European Union.  But it would overstate the level of 
European fragmentation to suggest that Internet intermediaries operating within the 
European Union do so under no common legal standards.  This is because the 
extent of their liability is shaped to a large extent by a different European law:  the 
E-Commerce Directive.131 
Thus, although the showing that a plaintiff must make to hold an online 
intermediary secondarily liable for trademark infringement is not harmonized, the 
conditions under which such defendants will be immune from liability under any 
law are harmonized at the European level.  Transcending the terminological and 
conceptual differences among secondary liability standards for trademark 
infringement in Europe would have been politically fraught; enacting anew a 
common set of online immunities was a more achievable task, which is a lesson 
perhaps to bear in mind if international harmonization is thought desirable. 
Thus, Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive provides a hosting safe harbor, 
not unlike that found in Section 512 of the U.S. Copyright Act.132  However, unlike 
the U.S. safe harbor, it applies horizontally to trademark claims, and (even more 
importantly) to unfair competition or tort claims under national law.  Although Mr. 
Justice Arnold thought that eBay would likely prevail on accessory liability, he 
referred the question of whether eBay was covered by the safe harbor to the 
European Court of Justice.133 
Article 14 provides that: 
1.  Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of 
information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the 
service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of 
the service, on condition that: 
(a)  the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information 
and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from 
which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or 
 
 130. The term “secondary infringement” has a different (narrow) meaning in U.K. trademark law.  
See LIONEL BENTLY & BRAD SHERMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 930, 1074−76 (3d ed. 2008).  
However, the concept of what Mr. Justice Arnold calls “accessory liability” approximates to secondary 
infringement in U.S. law. 
 131. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 73, art. 14.  The E-Commerce Directive was transposed 
into U.K. law by the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations, 2002, S.I. 2002/2013.  In 
particular, Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive is implemented by regulation 19 of the U.K. 
regulations. 
 132. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (West 2014). 
 133. See L’Oréal S.A. v. eBay Int’l AG, [2009] EWHC 1094, [380]–[82] (Ch) (Eng.) (determining 
eBay was not liable as a joint tortfeasor under principles of accessory liability); see id. [443] (declining 
to rule on Article 14 safe harbor issue because more guidance from the EU Court of Justice was needed).  
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(b)  the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously 
to remove or to disable access to the information. 
2.  Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is acting under the 
authority or the control of the provider.134 
eBay argued that L’Oréal’s refusal to participate in the VeRO program meant that 
eBay could not have the knowledge or awareness required for loss of immunity.135  
Indeed it suggested that to hold otherwise would be tantamount to imposing on 
eBay a general obligation to monitor contrary to Article 15 of the E-Commerce 
Directive.136 
L’Oréal argued that Article 14(1) could not apply because the activities of eBay 
went “far beyond the mere passive storage of information provided by third 
parties.”137  On the contrary, L’Oréal alleged, eBay “actively organized and 
participated in the processing and use of the information to effect the advertising, 
offering for sale, exposing for sale and sale of goods (including infringing 
goods).”138 
The Court of Justice found first that eBay was potentially entitled to the benefit 
of Article 14 as an information society service provider.  Whether eBay was such a 
provider within the protection afforded by the safe harbor would as a threshold 
matter depend upon how active it was in the allegedly illegal activity.139  If it had 
been involved in “optimising the presentation of the offers for sale in question or 
promoting those offers, it [would] be considered not to have taken a neutral 
position . . . [and thus unable] to rely, in the case of those [offers],” on the Article 
14 exemption.140  Determination of that question was, however, left to national 
courts.141 
Second, by the terms of Article 14, even if eBay was insufficiently inactive to 
qualify as an information services provider, it would lose immunity “if it was aware 
 
 134. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 73, art. 14. 
 135. L’Oréal, [2009] EWHC 1094, [436]. 
 136. Id.; see also E-Commerce Directive, supra note 73, art. 15 (“Member States shall not impose 
a general obligation on providers, when providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to 
monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or 
circumstances indicating illegal activity.”). 
 137. L’Oréal, [2009] EWHC 1094, [437]. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 113; see id. ¶ 115 
(“[T]he mere fact that the operator of an online marketplace stores offers for sale on its server, sets the 
terms of its service, is remunerated for that service and provides general information to its customers 
cannot have the effect of denying it the exemptions from liability provided for by [the E-Commerce 
Directive].”).  The fact that certain services are automated should not always mean that the provider of 
those services is itself not “active.”  Algorithmic development is surely relevant behavior in assessing 
degrees of activity.  But see Kur, supra note 99, at 531 (noting the majority position in German case law 
that has treated suggestions proffered by operation of algorithms as within the protection of Article 14).  
 140. L’Oréal, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 116.  The Advocate-General had questioned the neutrality 
condition, which had first been articulated in Google France, but extracted from a recital addressed to a 
provision other than Article 14.  See id. ¶¶ AG 139−46.  But the court reaffirmed what it had previously 
said on this point in Google France.  See id. ¶¶ 113−16. 
 141. Id. ¶ 117. 
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of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent economic operator should 
have realised that the offers for sale in question were unlawful and, in the event of 
it being so aware, failed to act expeditiously.”142 
We thus return to the conundrum from Tiffany of whether, in seeking to 
establish a key element of potential liability (or, in the EU, non-immunity), 
knowledge or awareness could be general in nature.  In L’Oréal, the Court of 
Justice offered further guidance on the definition of the relevant knowledge, but 
without specifically tackling that question.143  In particular, the court indicated that 
the knowledge or awareness requiring removal of a listing could arise either from 
eBay’s own investigation or notification from a third party (most likely the mark 
owner).144  This only minimally aids understanding.  Some of the Internet 
platforms that are signatories to the MOU have expressed concern that “proactive 
measures” they adopt under that agreement might (despite the language of the 
MOU) give them awareness of facts “by virtue of their own investigation” and 
hence put them under an obligation to act.145 
The Court of Justice had previously addressed the question of immunity in 
Google France, and its ruling in L’Oréal followed the same pattern.  Search 
engines could potentially come within Article 14.146  But resolution of that was a 
matter for the national court, taking into account the role Google played, inter alia, 
in the selection of keywords.147  There, the question might be whether Google’s use 
of its Keyword Suggestion Tool renders its activities “non-neutral” and makes it 
vulnerable to loss of immunity under Article 14.  And again, in any event, whether 
Google could invoke Article 14 would depend upon disabling advertisements upon 
receiving notice.148 
The Court of Justice has thus not finally decided on the availability of the safe 
harbor for either search engines or auction sites, leaving that to be fought out 
among the lower national courts.149  The safe harbor in the E-Commerce Directive 
 
 142. Id. ¶ 124 (quoting Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive).  In decisions handed down in 
May 3, 2012 on similar facts to eBay v. L’Oreal, the French Supreme Court held that eBay could not 
avail itself of the protection under Article 14 because it had played too active a role by assisting sellers 
in the promotion and fostering of sales.  See Cass. com., May 3, 2012, Bull. civ. IV, No. 89 (Fr.) (eBay 
Inc. v. LVMH, Parfums Christian Dior); see also Beatrice Martinet Farano, French Supreme Court 
Denies eBay Hosting Protection, TRANSATLANTIC ANTITRUST & IPR DEVELOPMENTS, Issue No. 3/2012 
(June 21, 2012), available at http://ttlfnews.wordpress.com/2012/07/02/transatlantic-antitrust-and-ipr-
developments-issue-no-32012-june-21-2012 (discussing the French Supreme Court’s decision, in which 
the court specifically relied on the “active role” standard from the Court of Justice’s L’Oréal and Google 
France decisions). 
 143. See L’Oréal, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶¶ 118−23. 
 144. See id. ¶ 122. 
 145. See Report from the Commission, supra note 42, at 11. 
 146. See Joined Cases C-236/08−C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 
2010 E.C.R. I-2417, ¶¶ 106−20. 
 147. See id. ¶ 119. 
 148. See id. ¶ 120. 
 149. For example, the Madrid Court of Appeals has recently held that Google (as the owner of 
YouTube) was acting as a host under Article 14 in the context of a copyright infringement case.  See 
Audiencia Provincial Sentencia [A.P.S.] [Provincial Appellate Court Sentence] Madrid, Jan. 14, 2014 
(No. 11/2014) (Spain) (Gestevision Telecinco, S.A. v. YouTube, LLC), translated in Decision No. 
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has, however, strongly encouraged the development of a notice and takedown 
procedure in Europe, not unlike that which Tiffany requires by virtue of its reading 
of the affirmative secondary liability standard.  Indeed, such a system is effectively 
evolving as a matter of practice. 
However, there is an important difference to note.  Under EU law, failing to 
comply with notice and takedown (or any other element of the safe harbor) doesn’t 
mean liability; it just means no automatic immunity.  Under Tiffany, continuing to 
supply services after notice will trigger liability.  In Europe, liability will only arise 
if the standard for secondary liability is also met under the applicable national 
law.150  Certainly in the United Kingdom, it is entirely possible that one could fail 
to come within the safe harbor but still not be held secondarily liable as a joint 
tortfeasor.151 
iii.  Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive 
In the European Union, the picture is rendered more complex—but more 
harmonious and flexible—by Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive.  Article 11 
requires member states to ensure that “right holders are in a position to apply for an 
injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to 
infringe an intellectual property right.”152  This provision may be applicable to 
provide relief where an intermediary is between the zone of nationally determined 
liability and EU-guaranteed safe space (under Article 14 of the E-Commerce 
Directive).  Indeed, Article 11 might offer the possibility of injunctive relief even 
when the intermediary is within the safe harbor and thus immune from monetary 
 
11/2014 on YouTube v Telecinco, HOGAN LOVELLS GLOBAL MEDIA & COMM. WATCH (Feb. 14, 2014), 
http://www.hlmediacomms.com/files/2014/02/Telecinco-v-Youtube_EN.pdf; see also Martini Manna & 
Elena Martini, The Court of Turin on the Liability of Internet Service Providers, LEXOLOGY (June 10, 
2014), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ec9e1298-7367-4f0a-a263-0cbaff076e29 (report-
ing on similar outcomes in Italy on similar grounds in Delta TV Programs s.r.l. v. Google Inc., 
Tribunale Ordinare [Trib.] [Ordinary Court of First Instance] Turin, June 23, 2014, Docket No. 
38113/2013 (It.), available at http://www.ipinitalia.com/Ordinanza%20Youtube%20Torino.pdf).  But 
lacking definitive guidance from the Court of Justice, variations remain at the national level.  See Kur, 
supra note 99, at 531 (noting different approaches in Germany and France); see also supra note 142. 
 150. See, e.g., L’Oréal S.A. v. eBay Int’l AG, [2009] EWHC 1094, [344] (Ch) (Eng.) (noting that 
the question of secondary liability is a matter for national law). 
 151. There is no single correct conceptual approach to this relationship between liability standards 
and safe harbors.  The relationship can follow a number of forms.  For example, where statutory safe 
harbors have been enacted, they could represent the line (or a gap) between the area of immunity 
conferred by defenses and the zone of liability, or the two could overlap.  That is, safe harbors may, like 
many defenses, immunize conduct that would otherwise be infringing because the benefits that flow 
from the online services provided by the intermediary outweigh the costs of the infringement that they 
facilitate.  Alternatively, the safe harbor may simply create reassurance about activities that may or may 
not have been infringing.  The benefit of the latter scheme is that, despite its apparent redundancy, the 
safe harbor provides certainty, which is important because even valuable non-infringing activity can be 
chilled by the threat of liability.  Conduct that falls outside the safe harbor, but does not clearly attract 
secondary liability, remains conduct for which an intermediary might expect to be challenged by 
trademark owners trying to test the margins of secondary liability. 
 152. Directive 2004/48/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. (L 195) 22 [hereinafter Enforcement Directive]. 
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liability.153 
This was the final issue in the L’Oréal reference from Mr. Justice Arnold, who 
indicated that he might (under the English court’s equitable jurisdiction) be willing 
to offer some limited relief to implement the U.K. obligations under Article 11.154  
Mr. Justice Arnold referred a series of questions to the Court of Justice regarding 
the nature and content of that provision, though he suggested that appropriate 
measures might be devised along the lines that had been ordered by the German 
courts under its so-called Störerhaftung doctrine.155  Certainly, the German courts 
had worked under the assumption that that doctrine is a viable means of 
implementing member state obligations under Article 11.156 
The Court of Justice’s ruling articulates many important propositions, though it 
has not definitively answered many questions.  The central question before the 
court was whether Article 11 meant that trademark owners could secure injunctions 
against the operator of an online marketplace through which the mark owners’ 
rights have been infringed, requiring the operator to take measures to prevent future 
infringements of those rights.157 
The court held that, in light of the objective of the Enforcement Directive to 
ensure effective protection of intellectual property, such injunctions were 
permissible under Article 11, thus rendering assistance beyond that currently 
available in the U.S. courts.158  But what measures might these be?  The court 
recognized that national courts would devise precise measures using the procedural 
devices available to them,159 but sketched the general parameters, offered some 
non-exhaustive possibilities and stressed some limits on this form of relief.160 
As a general matter, the court held that measures must be “effective and 
dissuasive,” but also proportionate.161  Measures “need to strike a fair balance 
between the various rights and interests.”162  Such sentiments are hardly 
contentious, but also offer minimal guidance to national courts or online actors.  As 
concrete illustrations, the court mentioned only the possibility of an order “to 
suspend the perpetrator of the infringement . . . in order to prevent further 
infringements of that kind by the same seller in respect of the same trade marks,” 
and orders to take measures to make it easier to identify the primary infringers.163 
 
 153. See id., recital 45; id., arts. 12(3), 13(3), 14(3). 
 154. See L’Oréal, [2009] EWHC 1094, [454]. 
 155. See id. [455]−[65].  For an elaboration of this doctrine, see Leistner, supra note 122. 
 156. See generally Kur, supra note 99.  
 157. See Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 126.  
 158. Id. ¶ 131.  The applicability of Article 11 would not render the intermediary liable for 
damages. 
 159. See Enforcement Directive, supra note 152, recital 23; see also Directive 2001/29/EC, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, recital 29 [hereinafter 
Information Society Directive]. 
 160. See L’Oréal, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶¶ 136−43. 
 161. See id. ¶¶ 136, 141. 
 162. See id. ¶ 143. 
 163. Id. ¶¶ 141−42.  The Enforcement Directive, supra note 150, art. 8, contains a provision 
specifically authorizing this possibility and the copyright decision of the Court of Justice in Case C-
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Quite what this means in practice is not yet entirely clear.  The case was sent 
back to Mr. Justice Arnold to work out how to craft the appropriate order. But the 
case stalled and then recently settled, so the U.K. court did not have an opportunity 
to devise precise measures for the L’Oreal parties in accordance with the Court of 
Justice’s guidance.164  Instead, the process in Europe has taken a turn toward 
private ordering and the MOU discussed in Part I.B. above (to which both eBay 
and L’Oréal are parties).165 
Given the conceptual similarities between Article 11 and the Störerhaftung 
doctrine, German case law in particular might offer hints about additional contours.  
As with Article 11, the obligation imposed on a defendant under the Störerhaftung 
doctrine related to the prevention of future infringements.166  But this was not 
unlimited.  Although the defendant’s obligations were not limited to “future 
identical offers made by the same person, [they extended only to] infringements 
that were essentially of the same character.”167  Otherwise, this might amount to a 
general obligation to monitor.  Under the German doctrine, courts have discussed 
whether there exists a causal link between the defendant’s acts (or omissions) and 
the infringement, and whether the defendant is able factually and legally to prevent 
or terminate the infringement.168  Moreover, the intermediary was not obliged to act 
 
275/06, Promusicae v. Telefonica, 2008 E.C.R. I-271, suggested it would be permissible.  See also Case 
C-461/10, Bonnier Audio AB v. Perfect Commc’n Sweden AB, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000, 2 C.M.L.R. 42 
(2012) (order for information regarding subscriber to whom ISP gave IP address which was allegedly 
used to commit infringement); Golden Eye v. Telefonica, [2012] EWHC 723 (Ch) (Eng.) (order to 
similar effect).  A recent reference from Germany asks the Court of Justice to consider how measures 
regarding provision of information should take into account privacy concerns—a point that had also 
been raised by the Court of Justice in Scarlet.  See BGH Oct. 17, 2013, GRUR 1237, 2013 (Ger.) 
(Davidoff Hot Water) (German case referred to the EU Court of Justice where banking secrecy laws 
might be implicated by disclosure order); see also infra text accompanying notes 183−186 (discussing 
the Court of Justice’s Scarlet opinion).  
 164. See William Horobin & Greg Bensinger, L’Oréal, eBay Settle Dispute over Counterfeit 
Goods:  French Company Was Dissatisfied with Internet Retailer’s Response to Concerns, WALL ST. J. 
ONLINE (Jan. 15, 2014, 3:18 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270 
2304419104579322870801818590.  But see infra notes 203−205 and accompanying text (discussing 
Mr. Justice Arnold’s later copyright ruling, where he relied on the Court of Justice’s L’Oréal opinion in 
interpreting Article 8(3) of the Information Society Directive).  
 165. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 19, signature page.  
 166. See Kur, supra note 99, at 532−35 (discussing the relevant line of German cases). 
 167. See id. at 534; see also Leistner, supra note 122, at 79 (“Typically, the injunctions also 
require the interferer . . . to take reasonable measures, such as filtering, to prevent comparable 
infringements in the future.  However, such preventive measures must not be unreasonably burdensome 
in the sense that the provider is required to take steps which would jeopardise its entire business model.  
Instead, only reasonable and technically possible measures in order to identify comparable 
infringements, i.e., offers of the same trader or comparable counterfeit goods, should be imposed.”).  
Kur does express a concern that the second Rapidshare judgment may move too far beyond this 
important limit and flirt with a violation of Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive.  See Kur, supra 
note 99, at 538 (citing the second Rapidshare judgment, BGH Aug. 15, 2013, GRUR 1030, 2013 (Ger.) 
(File-Hosting-Dienst)). 
 168. See Kur, supra note 99, at 532; cf. Dogan, supra note 3, at 516 n.85 (“‘Reasonableness,’ of 
course, does not require the intermediary to do the impossible, and many courts have made clear that 
contributory infringement defendants must have ‘sufficient control over the infringing activity to merit 
liability.’” (citing Gucci Am., Inc. v. Frontline Processing Corp., 721 F. Supp. 2d 228, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010)) (internal quotations omitted)). 
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with regard to “infringements whose character is doubtful or which cannot be 
detected by reasonable means.”169  Applying these principles, courts have ordered 
the takedown of infringing listings by online auction sites and imposed obligations 
on intermediaries to engage in a measure of technological checking (such as 
filtering) to minimize future infringement.170 
At some point, there is a risk that any measures—especially if pursued by 
numerous mark owners—could effectively amount to a general obligation on 
intermediaries to monitor the activity of their customers, violating the principles 
that are both enshrined in Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive and behind the 
reluctance (in the United States and Europe) to create broad secondary liability.171  
German courts have been alert to this concern in applying the Störerhaftung 
doctrine, as was the Court of Justice in L’Oréal.172  The L’Oréal court made clear 
that measures under Article 11 could not impose an obligation to actively monitor 
all of the “data of each of its customers in order to prevent any future infringement 
of intellectual property rights via that provider’s website.”173  According to the 
court, this would not be fair and proportionate.174  Indeed, the court also instructed 
national courts that measures could not create barriers to legitimate trade by 
effecting “a general and permanent prohibition on the selling, on that marketplace, 
of goods bearing those trademarks.”175  (The district court in Tiffany suspected that 
the lawsuit was in part to stop the permissible resale of used goods.176) 
 
 169. See Kur, supra note 99, at 534, 536−37; see also Leistner, supra note 122, at 78−82; see, e.g., 
BGH Mar. 11, 2004, 158 BGHZ 236 (Ger.) (Internet Auction I), translated in 2005 EUR. TRADE MARK 
REP. 25, ¶ 41 (“In the event of an order on injunctive relief being issued, then the defendant would only 
be held liable for breaches if it committed a culpable act.  . . .  For trade mark infringements which 
cannot be recognized in the filtering procedure applied in advance (because, for example, a counterfeit 
Rolex watch is on offer at a price appropriate for an original, without reference to its counterfeit 
character), no fault would be attached.”). 
 170. See generally Leistner, supra note 122, at 79; see, e.g., BGH Mar. 11, 2004, 158 BGHZ 236 
(Internet Auction I), translated in 2005 EUR. TRADE MARK REP. 25, ¶ 41 (“[E]very time that the 
defendant is notified of a clear breach of the law, it must not only block the concrete offer without delay 
. . . but also apply preventative measures to ensure as far as possible that no further trade mark 
infringements of this kind occur.  In the case in dispute . . . a number of clearly recognisable trade mark 
infringements have occurred.  The defendant must see these events as a reason to subject offers for 
Rolex watches to specific checking.  . . .  It may be possible for the defendant to make use of a software 
program in this connection to reveal the corresponding suspicious cases, with the relevant suspect points 
being perhaps the low price and also any reference to imitation.”). 
 171. The E-Commerce Directive recognizes that preventing recurring infringement may require 
some specific monitoring, and that if properly tailored this will not violate Article 15.  See E-Commerce 
Directive, supra note 73, recital 48. 
 172. Kur, supra note 99, at 536−37; Leistner, supra note 122, at 79; see BGH Mar. 11, 2004, 158 
BGHZ 236 (Internet Auction I), translated in 2005 EUR. TRADE MARK REP. 25, ¶ 40 (“A company 
which . . . operates a platform for third-party auctions on the internet cannot reasonably be expected to 
investigate every offer prior to publication on the internet to identify any possible breach of the law.  
Any such obligation would place in question the entire business model . . . .”). 
 173. Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 139. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. ¶ 140. 
 176. Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 510 n.36 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[T]here is at 
least some basis in the record for eBay’s assertion that one of Tiffany’s goals in pursuing this litigation 
is to shut down the legitimate secondary market in authentic Tiffany goods.”).  
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The operative principles found in German law, which are consistent with the 
Court of Justice’s L’Oréal ruling, are similar to those considerations that might 
inform a lowest cost avoider or reasonableness analysis under U.S. tort law.177  
Indeed, the mechanism introduced by the Enforcement Directive is clearly 
motivated by that kind of normative principle.178  As noted in Part II.A. above, 
similar considerations may be silently informing the application by U.S. courts of 
the doctrinally narrow Inwood/Tiffany standard.  But to the extent that there are 
parallels in substance, two important distinctions must be kept in mind.  First, the 
principles developed in Europe under Article 11 will be generated by courts 
transparently in a range of factual settings (although the precise transparency of 
measures taken under the MOU remains a matter of debate).179  And, second, 
Article 11 will not—unlike secondary liability under implicit evolving U.S. 
doctrine—expose intermediaries to damages liability.  This is not insignificant; as 
noted above, awards in excess of $10 million have been made against online 
intermediaries found contributorily liable.180 
b.  Article 8(3) of the Information Society Directive 
The Court of Justice has not had an opportunity to comment further on the 
application of Article 11 in the trademark context.  And this might raise one further 
concern about the potential costs of this mechanism (especially if development of 
appropriate measures going forward occurs under the rubric of the MOU):  
legitimate and innovative business models might be chilled as much by the 
uncertainty of legal standards as by risk of monetary liability.181  The experience of 
the German courts applying its Störerhaftung doctrine in trademark cases may 
provide only limited comfort. 
However, Article 11 extended to all intellectual property the mechanism 
previously introduced into copyright law by Article 8(3) of the Information Society 
Directive.182  The developing jurisprudence under that parallel provision should 
 
 177. See Leistner, supra note 122, at 88 (identifying as considerations relevant to the imposition of 
relief, based upon an analysis of European law:  “[T]he degree of (objective) risk caused by the 
secondary infringer as well as the degree of control the secondary infringer has in relation to the acts of 
direct infringement . . . .  Moreover, the (objective) design of a business model of an intermediary might 
establish tortious liability where the business model is specifically designed to profit from direct acts of 
infringement . . . .”); cf. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 939 (2005) (relevance of 
design); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (extent of non-
infringing use); Dogan, supra note 3, at 510 (discussing control).  
 178. See Information Society Directive, supra note 159, recital 59 (“In many cases, intermediaries 
are best placed to bring . . . infringing activities [of third parties using their services] to an end.”). 
 179.  See supra note 45. 
 180. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 181. This is not to say that the extent of possible monetary liability might not also be relevant to 
chilling effects.  See, e.g., Michael Carrier, No Statutory Damages for Secondary Liability, DISRUPTIVE 
COMPETITION PROJECT (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.project-disco.org/intellectual-property/013014-no-
statutory-damages-for-secondary-liability.  The EU model to some extent reflects this concern even 
more deeply by denying any monetary relief under the E-Commerce Directive and funneling all relief 
through Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive. 
 182. Information Society Directive, supra note 159.  
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perhaps give some further reassurance to those concerned that the mechanism is 
simply a back-door way of placing the burden of policing on intermediaries. 
In that context, the Court of Justice has decided two cases brought by a Belgian 
collecting society (SABAM) seeking an order for an Internet service provider 
(Scarlet) and a social media network (Netlog) to install a filter system to help 
prevent future copyright infringement facilitated by their respective services.183  In 
both cases, the court found that the immunities of the E-Commerce Directive were 
applicable to prevent full liability.  And in both cases, the court found that Article 
8(3) of the Information Society Directive was potentially applicable.  But in both 
cases, the court found that the imposition of the filtering obligation that had been 
sought was not justified. 
The court concluded that the question of the appropriate relief had to be 
considered in light of other European instruments, as well as general principles of 
European Union law and fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  In particular, the court also looked to:  
(1) the E-Commerce Directive, which in Article 15 prohibits a general obligation 
on Internet service providers actively to monitor; (2) the general principle of EU 
law that any relief be proportionate and (3) the fundamental right to have “freedom 
to conduct a business” as guaranteed by Article 16 of the Charter.184  The court 
found that the requested obligation to filter all data from all customers for any 
future infringement of intellectual property for an unlimited time violated each of 
these principles.185 
 
 183. Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA 
(SABAM) v. Netlog NV,  2012 E.C.R. I-00000, 2 C.M.L.R. 18 (2012); Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended 
SA v. Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), 2011 E.C.R. I-11959. 
 184. Similar considerations have informed German law applying the Störerhaftung doctrine.  See 
Kur, supra note 99, at 527. 
 185. The Court of Justice may have been more solicitous of the fundamental rights of the Internet 
service provider than was the European Court of Human Rights in its first case addressing the liability of 
ISPs, handed down in October 2013.  See Delfi v. Estonia, App. No. 64569/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), 
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-126635#{“itemid”:[“001-126 
635”]}.  In that case, the Court of Human Rights held that it was not necessarily incompatible with the 
free expression guarantee of Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights for an Estonian 
news portal to be held monetarily liable as a result of anonymous (allegedly defamatory) comments 
posted on its Web site by users in response to a news story on the site.  Indeed, the failure to 
contemplate such liability might implicate the rights of the defamed party under Article 8 of the 
Convention.  See id. ¶ 91.  The Court of Human Rights did not, however, need to have regard to the 
prohibition against general monitoring found in secondary EU law, and it likewise did not have to weigh 
in the balance the freedom to conduct business under Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
Thus, although the Convention on Human Rights has been more clearly incorporated into EU law post-
Lisbon Treaty, see Treaty on European Union, art. 6(3), 2010 O.J. (C 83-13) (“Fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute 
general principles of the Union’s law.”), the variety of norms at play in a case before the Court of Justice 
suggests that a different outcome might ensue under EU law.  See id. art. 6(1) (“The Union recognises 
the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union . 
. . which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.”).  This implicates the difficult relationship 
between the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  See generally Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, The European Union and 
Human Rights After the Treaty of Lisbon, 11 HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 645 (2011).  
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The SABAM cases thus establish an extremely balanced framework for courts 
thinking through the competing values at stake in these types of cases.186  The 
court’s most recent copyright case under Article 8(3), UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH 
v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH, likewise exemplifies this nuance and balance.187  
There, owners of the copyright in cinematographic works applied to the Austrian 
courts for an order requiring an Austrian Internet service provider (ISP) to block 
the access of its customers to Web sites on which allegedly infringing copies of the 
plaintiff’s works were available.  The ISP against whom the orders were sought did 
not host the Web sites where the alleged infringements were available.  Rather, the 
ISP provided Internet access to its customers, who were thus able to access the 
Web site where the infringements were occurring.188  The order was sought 
pursuant to an Austrian procedure implementing Article 8(3) of the Information 
Society Directive.  The Court of Justice was required to consider whether the order 
was of the type that member states were required by Article 8(3) to make available 
to copyright owners and whether the particular Austrian procedure—which resulted 
in a general order to the ISP to achieve a particular outcome without detailing 
specific measures by which to do so—was compatible with the fundamental rights 
of the ISP and its customers.189 
The Court of Justice concluded that the particular Austrian procedure could, 
under certain conditions, fulfill Austria’s obligations under Article 8(3) and be 
compatible with fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union.190  The court deduced these conditions from a 
 
 186. Cf. Kur, supra note 99, at 532–35 (discussing the German approach, which is commendable 
for its efforts to find a middle solution that strikes a fair balance between the interests involved; but, on 
the other hand, it burdens ISPs not only with specific monitoring duties but with insecurity about what 
precisely is required of them); Leistner, supra note 122, at 79 (suggesting that the solution found by the 
German courts “strikes a fair balance between IPRs and the interest of genuinely ‘neutral’ host 
providers”). 
 187. See Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH, 2014 
E.C.R. I-00000. 
 188. Recently, some trademark owners have also chosen ISPs as intermediary defendants.  See, 
e.g., Juliette Garside, Cartier and Montblanc Owner in Court Action to Stop Online Sale of Counterfeits, 
GUARDIAN, May 29, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/may/29/cartier-montblanc-
owner-court-stop-sale-counterfeits-online (reporting on action brought by trademark owner against 
broadband providers).  Article 8(3) did not require a specific relationship between the alleged infringer 
and the intermediary against whom an injunction was sought.  See Telekabel, 2014 E.C.R. I-00000, ¶¶ 
35, 38.  The Court did not address the suggestion by the Advocate-General that the principle of 
proportionality might, however, warrant the infringers or the host ISP being pursued first.  See 
Telekabel, 2014 E.C.R. I-00000, ¶ AG 107 (“[I]t should be noted that the ISP is not in a contractual 
relationship with the operator of the copyright-infringing website.  As a consequence . . . a claim against 
the ISP is, admittedly, not completely out of the question, but the originator must, as a matter of priority, 
so far as is possible, claim directly against the operators of the illegal website or their ISP.”). 
 189. The modalities of injunction practice under Article 8(3)—like Article 11 of the Enforcement 
Directive—are a matter of national law.  So variation among member states is allowed subject to the 
constraints of EU law.  See Telekabel, 2014 E.C.R. I-00000, ¶¶ 43–44.  That is to say, the Court of 
Justice was considering whether the Austrian approach was permissible, and not whether that procedure 
was required in all member states.  See infra note 195 (comparing the nature of blocking orders in the 
United Kingdom). 
 190. See Telekabel, 2014 E.C.R. I-00000, ¶ 64. 
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balancing of the three fundamental Charter interests implicated by this type of 
order, none of which were absolute:  the interests of the intellectual property owner 
under Article 17; the freedom of the ISP to conduct business under Article 16 and 
the freedom of expression of Internet users under Article 11.191  In the course of its 
judgment, the court fleshed out the content of the three Charter rights at issue in 
ways that suggest continuing sensitivity to the competing concerns expressed in the 
SABAM cases and earlier in this article.192  And these considerations are surely 
transferable both to remedial mechanisms employed in other member states and 
with respect to orders involving other intellectual property rights under Article 11 
of the Enforcement Directive.193 
In short, the Court of Justice required that procedural protections be in place for 
ISP and user interests.  The ISP’s freedom to conduct business under Article 16 
was not absolute, but it is obviously affected by the type of order at issue in the 
case.194  And this may be exacerbated by the lack of specific measures in the 
outcome-based order imposed by the Austrian court, which may impose high 
uncertainty costs on the ISP.195  However, the Court of Justice found the outcome-
based order acceptable because, by leaving to the ISP the power to determine the 
measures to be taken to achieve the result desired, the ISP could “choose to put in 
place measures which are best adapted to the resources and abilities available to 
him and which are compatible with the other obligations and challenges which he 
will encounter in the exercise of his activity.”196  This reasoning, no doubt 
informed by the principle of proportionality—which overlays all enforcement 
questions under EU law—implicitly expresses some support for the sentiment that 
the measures appropriately imposed on one intermediary might differ from those to 
be implemented by another of quite different size and sophistication.197  The 
proportionality of the Austrian procedure was also supported by the fact that it 
allowed the ISP to show that it had “taken all reasonable measures,” ensuring that it 
would not be “required to make unbearable sacrifices,”198 which would have 
 
 191. See id. ¶ 47. 
 192. See supra Part I. 
 193. Because different member states might implement their obligations under Article 8(3) or 
Article 11 in different ways, see supra note 189, the precise conditions that the court imposed on the 
Austrian courts might not apply to orders of a slightly different nature issued by other courts.  For 
example, some of the detailed procedural protections identified in Telekabel flow from the outcome-
based order issued by the Austrian court, and may not apply to orders detailing specific measures that 
have to be implemented.  See Martin Husovec, CJEU Allowed Website-Blocking Injunctions with Some 
Reservations, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 631, 633 (2014) (commenting upon applicability of 
Telekabel to orders that have been issued by the U.K. courts).  But the broad principles announced by 
the Court of Justice will apply to slightly different orders issued by non-Austrian courts. 
 194. See Telekabel, 2014 E.C.R. I-00000, ¶¶ 50−51. 
 195. In other countries (such as the United Kingdom) orders issued under the relevant provisions 
have been far more specific, and have been framed in terms of the measures to be implemented rather 
than the general outcome to be achieved.  See infra note 203 (listing U.K. cases).  In those countries, 
mechanisms devised by the court to deal with the principle of legal certainty will be less crucial to 
ensuring compliance with the fundamental rights of the ISP.  
 196. See Telekabel, 2014 E.C.R. I-00000, ¶ 52. 
 197. See supra text accompanying notes 8−9. 
 198. See Telekabel, 2014 E.C.R. I-00000, ¶ 53. 
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interfered with the essence of its Article 16 right to conduct business.  Moreover, 
lest uncertainty serve to disrupt this balance, the court emphasized that it had to be 
possible for the ISP “to maintain before the court, once the implementing measures 
which he has taken are known and before any decision imposing a penalty on him 
is adopted, that the measures taken were indeed those which could be expected of 
him in order to prevent the proscribed result.”199 
Perhaps more intriguingly, the court gave substantial weight to the free 
expression interests of Internet users (the customers of the ISP).200  Indeed, it 
required the ISP to take account of those interests when it chooses the measures to 
be adopted in order to comply with the injunction, requiring that such measures be 
“strictly targeted, in the sense that they must serve to bring an end to a third party’s 
infringement of copyright or of a related right but without thereby affecting internet 
users who are using the provider’s services in order to lawfully access 
information.”201  Moreover, it insisted that national courts must be able to check on 
compliance with that obligation, requiring “national procedural rules [that make it 
possible] for internet users to assert their rights before the court once the [ISP’s 
measures] are known.”202 
Telekabel thus suggests that the Court of Justice will give a reading to Article 11 
of the Enforcement Directive that is properly attentive to the range of interests 
involved in cases alleging (what some would call) secondary liability for trademark 
infringement.  And developments in the U.K. courts applying Article 8(3) are 
largely consistent with this prediction.  Although Mr. Justice Arnold was not 
required to hand down any opinion in L’Oréal on remand because the case settled, 
he has tackled the question in the copyright context, first in Twentieth Century Fox 
Film Corp. v. British Telecommunications PLC (Newzbin II).203  As Newzbin II was 
 
 199. Id. ¶ 54. 
 200. Typically, in copyright cases involving the direct interpretation of copyright legislation, the 
Court of Justice views copyright as a “right” of authors and treats limitations thereon designed to further 
user freedoms as interests or exceptions.  This is a debate about the juridical character of user interests 
that can be seen worldwide.  But when filtered through the balancing mechanisms of a fundamental 
rights analysis, the user interests are put on a par with those of intellectual property owners, and with 
those of intermediaries.  The effects of injecting fundamental rights discourse into intellectual property 
adjudication on a routine basis remain to be seen.  But one possible effect might be the readjustment of 
the conceptual relationship between author and user interests. 
 201. See Telekabel, ¶¶ 55−56.  This requirement appears to suggest that measures resulting in 
over-enforcement may be problematic, although it is not clear how much over-enforcement would 
violate fundamental user rights.  The Court of Justice seemed less concerned with under-enforcement, a 
consideration that has prompted some national courts to deny relief on the basis that futile measures are 
not proportionate.  The court’s conclusion is to some extent the result of recognizing that intellectual 
property rights are themselves not absolute.  See id. ¶ 58−60.  According to the court, effective 
protection of the Article 17(2) right requires that measures “must have the effect of preventing 
unauthorised access . . . or, at least, of making it difficult to achieve and seriously discouraging internet 
users who are using the services [from accessing the infringing work made available in violation of Art 
17(2)], thus largely rejecting the futility argument.”  Id. ¶ 63. 
 202. Id. ¶ 57; cf. 17 U.S.C. § 512(g) (West 2014) (counter notice possibility for those on whom 
DMCA takedown notices are served). 
 203. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. British Telecommc’ns PLC (Newzbin II), [2011] 
EWHC 1981 (Ch) (Eng.); see also Dramatico Entm’t Ltd. v. British Sky Broad. Ltd., [2012] EWHC 
1152 (Ch) (Eng.); Golden Eye v. Telefonica, [2012] EWHC 723 (Ch) (Eng.); Twentieth Century Fox v. 
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decided just a few weeks after L’Oréal was handed down by the Court of Justice, 
Mr. Justice Arnold was able to rely on L’Oréal in interpreting Article 8(3).204  In 
Newzbin II, he held that an order to an ISP to block access to pirate Internet sites 
was permissible, provided that the order was clear and targeted—that is to say, 
proportionate.205  It was extremely important to him that the cost of implementation 
to the ISP would be modest and proportionate.206 
This case law has developed most substantially in the context of copyright 
law.207  However, as Mr. Justice Arnold indicated in Newzbin II, the principles 
applicable to determine appropriate measures under Article 11/Article 8(3) (and 
whether such measures comply with European law) transcend intellectual property 
law.  As noted above, U.S. courts have resisted the temptation to assimilate the 
standards for secondary liability under copyright and trademark law.208  And some 
European scholars have questioned whether European trademark law should so 
readily adopt a system of notice and takedown that mimics that found in copyright 
law.209  But to the extent that secondary liability trademark claims raise similar 
concerns about chilling technological development and about the dangers of over-
enforcement of rights where technologies are used for both infringing and non-
infringing purposes, a horizontal approach does not seem wholly inappropriate. 
The fact that the mechanism (or the general normative goal) is the same in 
copyright and trademark cases does not mean that Article 11 and Article 8(3) will 
be applied in exactly the same fashion in both types of disputes.210  There are 
 
Newzbin Ltd. (Newzbin I), [2010] EWHC 608 (Ch) (Eng.). 
 204. “Section 97A [which implements Article 8(3)] must be interpreted and applied consistently 
with the Court of Justice’s guidance in L’Oréal v eBay.  In my judgment the court’s reasoning 
demonstrates that the jurisdiction is not confined to the prevention of the continuation, or even 
repetition, of infringements of which the service provider has actual knowledge.  On the contrary, an 
injunction may be granted requiring the service provider ‘to take measures which contribute to . . . 
preventing further infringements of that kind.’  Although such measures may consist of an order 
suspending the subscriber’s account or an order for disclosure of the subscriber’s identity, the Court of 
Justice makes it clear that these examples are not exhaustive, and that other kinds of measures may also 
be ordered.”  Newzbin II, [2011] EWHC 1981, [156]. 
 205. See id. at [177]. 
 206. Id. at [200] (“The order is a narrow and targeted one, and it contains safeguards in the event 
of any change of circumstances.  The cost of implementation to BT would be modest and 
proportionate.”).  In some other EU member states, courts have arguably taken a more skeptical view of 
efforts to require blocking orders.  See, e.g., Gerechtshof [Hof] [court of appeals] The Hague, Jan. 28, 
2014, No. 200.105.418-01, (Ziggo/Brein) (Neth.), available at http://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/ 
inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2014:88 (describing blocks as both “ineffectual” and—perhaps 
inconsistently—“an infringement of people’s freedom to act in their discretion”). 
 207. Indeed, it has developed sufficiently far under Section 97A of the U.K. Copyright, Design and 
Patents Act 1988, that the Deregulation Bill 2014−15 would repeal Sections 17 and 18 of the Digital 
Economy Act 2010, which had allowed for the adoption of regulations requiring ISPs to disconnect 
certain customers using their accounts to infringe.  See Deregulation Bill 2014−15, H.L. Bill 33 cl. 41 
(U.K.) (second reading H.L. July 3, 2014). 
 208. See supra note 4. 
 209. See Martin R.F. Senftleben, An Uneasy Case for Notice and Takedown:  Context Specific 
Trademark Rights (Mar. 16, 2012), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract/=2025075.  
 210. Nor does it mean that measures appropriate outside the context of intellectual property 
should, for mere reasons of practical convenience and minimal cost, apply to copyright cases under 
Article 8(3) of the Information Society Directive or trademark cases under Article 11 of the 
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important differences in both the factual and legal contexts in which the applicable 
provision would be invoked in the two different regimes.211  For example, as a 
factual matter, file-matching technology is more likely to be able to accurately 
identify copyright-infringing files, and thus can be implemented at lower cost than 
the human-intensive assessments that might be required in the case of trademark 
claims.  It may be that the costs of identifying infringements should fall more 
heavily on mark owners than on copyright owners in weighing the variables 
relevant to a reasonable compromise of duties.212  Article 11 is based on the 
normative principle of lowest-cost-avoider, which—in its full force—has been 
rejected by the U.S. courts.213  That principle surely allows for such context-
specific assessment.  As a legal matter, the range of permissible uses may vary 
between copyright and trademark, altering the calculus of effect on the conduct of 
legitimate business.214 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Secondary liability of online intermediaries for trademark infringement revolves 
around different doctrinal devices internationally.  But both commercial practice 
and legal doctrine are coalescing around approaches built upon the mechanism of 
notice and takedown.  This is occurring through common law development of the 
secondary infringement standard in the United States, which effectively is 
constructing a safe space for intermediaries.  In Europe, it is occurring through the 
interaction of a directive designed to ensure effective enforcement and a directive 
explicitly designed to create room for innovative online actors (which, by negative 
implication, defines the scope of potential trademark liability). 
Even if this is the entire sum of current law, there are genuine questions to be 
 
Enforcement Directive.  Thus, in reaching the conclusion that some of the orders issued against 
intermediaries under Section 97A of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 were appropriate, Mr. 
Justice Arnold appears to have been influenced by the fact that the ISPs in question already maintained a 
list of sites blocked in order to prohibit access to child pornography, and that it would be minimally 
burdensome to add to that list sites hosting copyright infringements.  Newzbin II, [2011] EWHC 1981.  
As a pragmatic matter, this seems thoroughly sensible.  Viewed through the prism of weighing 
conflicting normative values, as occurs in the context of fundamental rights, it is not so obvious that the 
weight attaching to the social interest implicated in restricting access to child pornography is the same as 
that to be afforded to the protection of copyright. 
 211. There may also be differences between the types of measures appropriate in counterfeiting 
cases and those appropriate in cases of trademark infringement, again because the factual and legal 
context may be different, as evident perhaps from the decision of the drafters of the MOU to focus on 
counterfeiting.  See supra text accompanying note 31.  
 212. The factual context may also vary over time.  Thus, while most trademark cases will now 
involve some form of payment processing and shipment of a physical article, it is not clear how 3D 
printing might alter online practices with respect to counterfeit goods.  See Kur, supra note 99, at 528–
29. 
 213. See supra notes 63−65, for a discussion of the district court’s and Second Circuit’s rejection 
of the lowest cost avoider analysis in Tiffany.   
 214. See Senftleben, supra note 209, at 2 (focusing on the more limited nature of trademark 
rights).  In fact the relationship between the strength of copyright and trademark rights may be less 
linear than Professor Senftleben suggests.  But the basic point that the systems are different is well-
taken. 
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asked regarding whether the United States should put this notice and takedown 
system on a statutory footing, as it did with Section 512 of the Copyright Act after 
initial judicial creation.215  In the United States, the relationship between the tests 
for secondary infringement of copyright and trademark has been the subject of 
skeptical comment by both courts and scholars.  In Sony, the U.S. Supreme Court 
rejected assimilating secondary liability in copyright and trademark law.216  But in 
Europe, many of the relevant principles, as well as the basic structure of analysis, 
are applied more horizontally to both copyright and trademark claims, which 
properly reflects the different concerns at play in secondary liability cases.  And 
some scholars have presciently noted that common principles seem to inform U.S. 
copyright and trademark law.217  It should not be beyond the courts to recognize the 
different nature (factual and legal) of trademark claims in applying these principles 
to questions relevant to both secondary liability and appropriate injunctive relief. 
Extending Section 512 of the Copyright Act to trademarks might jeopardize 
judicial ability to adapt if stated in immense detail,218 but it would enhance 
certainty about what counts as notice.219  And it might allow the incorporation of 
mechanisms, such as counter-notification, which would address to some extent the 
possible chilling effect of over-enforcement that notice and takedown might create.  
If no action is taken, we can expect commercial practices, rather than treaties such 
as ACTA, to occupy the space. 
More fundamentally, it is not apparent that the state of current U.S. doctrine—as 
opposed to what might really be going on behind the formal doctrine—is 
sufficiently flexible to accommodate the range of concerns that one finds in 
secondary infringement cases.  Business models driven by technological innovation 
are not always definitively good or evil; they occupy a spectrum.  Likewise, not 
every online intermediary has the resources or sophistication of eBay or Google.  It 
might behoove the United States also to consider supplementing notice and 
takedown with the type of measure now found in Article 11 of the Enforcement 
 
 215. There may be hidden dangers for rights owners seeking to commandeer the Section 512 
regime in the fight against trademark infringement absent legislative reform.  See CrossFit, Inc. v. 
Alvies, No. 13-3771 SC, 2014 WL 251760 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2014) (invoking Section 512 to remedy 
trademark claims may give rise to liability under Section 512(f)). 
 216. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984) 
 217. See Dogan, supra note 3, at 503, 505. 
 218. Indeed, some might argue that further legislative delineation of the notice and takedown 
regime would be useful in Europe too, where the E-Commerce Directive is stated at a greater level of 
generality.  As Annette Kur has observed, “[T]he German Federal Supreme Court has given certain 
guidelines as to when a notification is to be considered as serious and plausible enough to give rise to 
removal and prevention claims, but those guidelines inevitably remain fairly vague and general.”  Kur, 
supra note 99, at 534; see also BGH Aug. 17, 2011, 191 BGHZ 19, (Ger.) (Perfume Stick), translated in 
44 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 123, 128, ¶ 28 (2013) (“This requires that the notice be 
worded so concretely as to allow the addressee of the notice to detect the violation easily—meaning 
without a thorough legal or factual examination.  The amount of effort to be expected of an operator of 
an internet trading platform in performing any such examination depends upon the circumstances of the 
individual case, especially upon the gravity of the reported infringements on the one hand and the 
operator’s opportunities to learn of them on the other hand.”). 
 219. Cf. Mostert & Schwimmer, supra note 6, at 265 (noting that at present intermediaries would 
be advised to respond even to notices that were “written in crayon”). 
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Directive. 
The European model may be complex, but in resisting a binary approach, it 
allows courts to develop a spectrum of relief dynamically as technological and 
social change occurs.  Observing the ways that EU courts use these Article 11 
powers in the coming years will help U.S. legislators assess whether such powers 
can be used in an effective and balanced way that is not so uncertain that it creates 
undue transaction costs. 
Of course, U.S. courts could develop in this direction simply by being true to 
their own statements and looking back to the common law of torts for inspiration, 
as the Supreme Court did in Grokster.  As Mark McKenna has suggested, the claim 
being advanced by Tiffany was essentially one of negligence, for which it would 
not be unknown in tort law to consider the complexities of the lowest cost avoider 
analysis.220  Such an analysis could over time generate a sense of conduct 
applicable to a different range of differently situated defendants.  This does seem to 
be the impulse that underlies some of the analysis in Tiffany—and later cases too, 
perhaps—and it may not be a bad thing for the doctrine to match reality.221  This 
might still allow eBay to prevail in cases such as Tiffany, but less diligent and less 
reasonable defendants may fare less well. 
 
 220. See McKenna, supra note 60. 
 221. The “willful blindness” caveat in Tiffany may reach the same result, but it seems to do so far 
less transparently.  See Dogan, supra note 3, at 518 (“[W]illful blindness, paired with the ‘reasonable 
response’ analysis in 1-800 Contacts, suggest that even those with only generalized knowledge of 
infringement have a duty to act responsibly in conducting their business.  The contributory infringement 
standard in Inwood—complemented by a robust doctrine of willful blindness—thus offers a balanced 
and normatively grounded approach to intermediary liability online.”).  And it does so under the threat 
of substantial monetary liability. 
